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Roberts: Criteria for the Award of a Foreign Air Route to a Domestic Air C

CRITERIA FOR THE AWARD OF A FOREIGN AIR
ROUTE TO A DOMESTIC AIR CARRIER*
EDWARD C. ROBERTS'
Until the early 1950's, United States international air
transportation was clearly pre-eminent throughout the world.
In the last decade many foreign countries have entered the
field or have expanded thdir 6perations. Policies advanced
fifteen years ago may no longer be appropriate ....
They
must be re-examined in the light of new developments and
adjusted to the requirements of the present and future.
-Project Horizon.2
1.
A.

INTRODUCTION

PRESENT STATUS OF THE INDUSTRY.

As Western Europe has recovered its commercial vigor
and new nations have sprung up all over the globe, the United
States has suddenly found itself subject to new and different
commercial and diplomatic pressures. Balance of payments
problems beset the Treasury. Exports have dropped off in
the face of rising imports. The United States is not easily
the dominant nation in international trade circles, but is often
the underdog. The situation is the same for international
aviation as it is for automobiles' and steel. The impact of
technology in the form of the high speed jet aircraft has
brought with it acute problems of competition. The desire to
furnish service with the most modern equipment has led to
the purchase of excess equipment. The resulting overcapacity
in turn has produced financial instability in the industry.3
At the same time foreign air carriers, who have been faced
4
with similar problems, have intensified competitive efforts.
*This is Part I of a two part Article. Part II will be published in the
second issue of volume sixteen of the South Carolina Law Review.-Ed.
1. LL.B. 1962, University of !South. Carolina; -LL.M. 1963, Georgetown University Law Center; partner in the firm of Martin andlRoberts,
Spartanburg, S. C.
2. FAA, Report of the Task Force on National Aviation Goals,
Project Horizon, 24, 119 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Project Horizon].
1 3. N. Y. Times, September 24, 1961, p. IF, col. 8; November 19, 1961,
p. XX, col. 1. Wall Street Journal, September 24, 1962, p; 5, col. 3.
The problems of mergers involving air ,carriers providing international
air service will be dealt with infra.
.
4. Project Horizon 25; Business Week, June 24, 1961, p. 57.
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To complicate the matter, many of the newly organizedn
tions have initiated international service to the major traffic
centers of the world. 5 Reprecussions have even been felt in
the United States airframe industry, which is presently
faced with declining markets because of increased competition from European manufacturers. ."
B.

NEED FOR ADJUDICATORY STANDARDS

If the United States air carrier industry were like the
mining or metals industry, a diagnosis of competitive ailments might call for a prescription of Adam Smith economics
to force the industry to meet competition rather than shrink
from it. But that is not the case with air carriage. The
health of the industry has not been entrusted to laissez-faire
principles. Rather, the wisdom of the Congress has been to
impose a system of regulated competition whereby the Civil
Aeronautics Board is entrusted with the delicate task of promoting and encouraging an economically sound and safe
system of air transportation by American air carriers.7
Inasmuch as the health of a regulated industry reflects
the efficacy of the administrative process, the present mazaise of United States carriers demands a re-evaluation of
policies of the C.A.B. which no longer seem to serye the
national interest and to implement new ones which will recapture American pre-eminence in international air transport. This is a job primarily for legislators and economists,
but the lawyer has his role, too. His contribution is made
"by endeavoring . . . to draw from the specific cases such
general principles governing the Board's action as are discernible from the opinions and [by] suggesting relevant
considerations that appear overlooked. ' 8 That Board policies
require such appraisal is evident from the strong criticism
5, Wall Street Journal, September 26, 1961, p. 1, col. 4; Marct 26.
1963, p. 11, col. 3.
6. Project Horizon 26, 106; Wall Street Journal, September 20, 1962,
p. 1, col. 1; February 19, 1963, p. 12, col. 2.
7. Federal Aviation Act of 1958 §§101-1312, 72 Stat. 737(1958); 49
U.S.C.A. §§1301-1542 (Supp. 1961). The Federal Aviation Act differs

from ordinary public utility statutes in that it seeks affirmatively to

promote or develop air transport whereas the purpose of the traditional
public utility statute seeks to protect existing utilities from competition
ano the customer from excessive rates. Maclay and Burt, Entry of

New Carriers into Domestic Air Transportation, 22 J.Am L.&CoM. 131,
133 (1955).
8. Westwood, Choice of the Air Carrier for New Air Transportation
Routes, 16 GEO.WASH.L.REV. 13 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Westwood],
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of the Board's failure to formulate clear statements of adinistrative policy.

One writer declares that the C.A.B.'s
lack of adjudicatory standards has caused a paralysis of the
Board's all important function of planning and coordinating
an effective national air transport policy. 9 Another charges
that "the inability of the C.A.B. to develop and to adhere
to intelligible standards in the issuance of competitive certificates of convenience and necessity has imposed higher
costs on the traveling public, and needless and serious losses
on airline investors." 10
Accordingly, the purpose of this article shall be to ascertain the existing criteria for the award of foreign air routes
to American air carriers. It is anticipated that this exposition will contribute to an understanding of the legal problems
of the statutory system of regulation of United States air
transport in foreign commerce. Beyond a simple knowledge
of this topic, it is hoped that this study will aid in the development of new legal and legislative policies designed to
strengthen the United States' position in international air
transport.
II. SELECTION OF THE CARRIER
A.

STATUTORY COMMAND

The statute which controls the award of air routes and tlhe
choice of air carriers is the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.11
The act does not define what has been familiarly termed a
"foreign air route." Instead it speaks of a certificate of public
convenience and necessity to engage in "foreign air commerce" 12 or "foreign air transportation," which are broadly
9. Hector, Problems of the C.A.B. and the Independent Regulatory
Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931 passim (1960) (Memorandum and Letter
of Resignation submitted to President Eisenhower May 10, 1959) [hereinafter cited as Hector].
10. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for
Better Definition of Standards. 75 HARv.L.REv. 863, 1072 (1962) (Holmes
Lectures 1962) [hereinafter cited as Friendly]. The necessity of a
clear definition of administrative standards has been recognized by

a recently circulated working draft of proposed policy declarations. Bluestone, Goals of the C.A.B., 5, 13, 23, 32, 33 (December 1962) [hereinafter

cited as Bluestone].
11. §101-1312, 72 Stat. 737 (1958); 49 U.S.C.A. §§1301-1542 (Supp.
1961). No substantial change was made in the economic controls by the
act of 1958, which superseded the Federal Aviation Act of 1938; the
design of Congress was to make the regulation of air safety more
effective. Hale and Hale, Competition of Control IV: Air Carriers,
109 U.PA.L.REv. 311, 312 (1961).
1 12. §101(20), 49 U.S.C.A. §1301(20) (1958).
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stated to be the "carriage of persons or property for compen-

sation or hire, or the carriage of mail by aircraft, or the operation or navigation of aircraft in the conduct or furtherance
of a business vocation in commerce."' 3 A domestic "air carrier" 14 is distinguished from a "foreign air carrier"' 51 in that
the former is a "citizen of the United States" which requires
that the "air carrier" be an "individual who is a citizen of the

United States," "a partnership in which each member is such
individual," or a domestic corporation which is substantially

staffed and controlled by such individuals.

6

Thus, for practi-

cal purposes a domestic air carrier can be said to be an American company which is engaged in commerce and transportation betveen the United States and foreign countries.' 7
In order for an air carrier to enter into foreign air com-

merce the act requires that the Civil Aeronautics Board18 find
that "the applicant is fit, willing, and able to perform such
transportation properly."' 9 The act further commands that
such transportation must be required by the public conveni-

ence and necessity. 20 It is apparent both from the statutory
13. §101(21) 49 U.S.C.A. §1301(21) (1958).

14. §101(3) 49 U.S.C.A. §1301(3) (1958).

15. §101(19), 49 U.S.C.A. §1301(19) (1958).
16. §101 (13), 49 U.S.C.A. §1301(13) (1958).
17. The act distinguishes "overseas" air transport from "foreigW"
air transport, §101(20) (21); 49 U.S.C.A. §1301(20) (21) (1958); the
former takes place between the United States and one of its possessions, the
latter between the United States or one of its possessions and a foreign
country. Because decisions on foreign air routes frequently involve
overseas possessions as intermediate points on the foreign air route,
cases on overseas air transport will be included in this survey whert
th0y are thought to be relevant to the problems of foreign air transport
C. Pan American World Airways, Inc., Matson-Inter-Island Contract, 3
A.B. 540, 5,47 (1942). Board decisions indicate that "new service"
means initial service between the points under consideration. Pan Amerivan Airways, Inc., Domestic Route Case, 11 C.A.B. 852, 859, 925 (1950);
American-Eastern Merger, Docket 133555, Examiner's Decision, November
27, 1962, p. 33 (Mimeograph copy) [hereinafter cited as American-Eastern
Merger Case]. But a consideration of the problems of entry into air
transportation indicates that '"ew service" is provided whenever a
"new" carrier applies for a route because travelers all along the carrier's
existing system will offer new opportunities for single-carrier service
between existing points and the proposed new terminus. Thus, "now
aarvice" may in fact duplicate service on the route applied for. Se
Westwood, at 5.
18. Hereinafter referred to as the "Board" or the "C.A.B."
19. §401(d), 49 U.S.C.A. §1371(d) (1958). §401(a), 49 U.S.C.A.
§1371(a) (1958).
20. Final approval must be given by the President. §801, 49 U.S.C.A.
§1461. Because of the intimate connection of foreign air routes with the
President's conduct of foreign policy these orders were held non-reviewable by courts. Chicago & Southern Airlines v. Waterman S.S. Co., 333
U.S. 103, 92 L.Ed. 568 1948) ; Pan American Airways v. C.A.B., 121 F.2d
810 (2d Cir. 1941). Cert. dismissed 332 U.S. 827 (1946). This rulhv

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss5/3

4

Criteria
for the-Award
of a Foreign
Route to a Domestic
1963] Roberts:
CRITERIA
AWARD
DOMESTIC
AmAir
CARRIER
871 Air C

command and the decisions of the Board that these two concepts are closely related. It is equally apparent that the con-

cepts have been readily confused and intermingled. 2 1 Therefore, in order to clarify the doctrines of the Board this survey

will separate the two.
B.

FrNESS AND ABILITY
1.

Experience

Under the criteria of fitness and ability the Board inquires
into the competency of the air carrier to operate the inter-

national route up for award. In practice this has come to mean
that the carrier must have a strong financial status, a corps
of operating personnel trained to fly in international aviation,
and a general fund of "experience" upon which to rely.22 In

the early cases decided by the Board emphasis was laid on
the carrier's having a technical and operation staff which

was readily expandible to operate a new route. 23 For this
reason companies which had never participated in interna-

tional aviation were frequently found to lack the reqhas been codified. §1006, 49 U.S.C.A. §1486. However, an exemption
by the Board does not require Presidential approval and is subject
to judicial review, §416, 49 U.S.C.A. §1386 (1958); Pan Am. World
Airways v. C.A.B., 261 F.2d 754, 756(D.C.Cir. 1958). See Jaffe, The
Right to Judicial Review, 71 HARv.L.R v. 401, 403-04 (1958); Hochman, Judicial Review of Administrative Processes in Which the President
Participates,74 HARv.L.Rnv. 684, 689-92, 704, 706, 707-10 (1961). Note,
Economic Regulation of Foreign Air Carriers by the C.A.B.: Its Legality
and Reviewability, 51 GEORGETOWN L.J. 593 (1963). The role of the
State Department in international negotiations is discussed at note
127 infra. Examples of Presidential action in international air transport include, e.g., Additional Service to Latin America, 6 C.A.B. 857,
892(1946); North Atlantic Route Transfer Case, 11 C.A.B. 676, 678-80
(1950); West Coast-Hawaii Case, 20 C.A.B. 7 (1955); Trans-Pacific
Certificate Renewal Case, 20 C.A.B. 47(1955); Trans-Pacific Route
Case, note 63 infra; see New York-Mexico City Nonstop Service Case,
25 C.A.B. 823 (1957).
21. Staff of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Report on the Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect 41 (Comm.
Print. 1960) (Landis Report) [hereinafter cited as Landis]. This
method of separating route planning and route awards was used in
recent international route investigations. See note 27 infra.
22. Pan Am. Airways (Del.), Transatlantic Operations, 1 C.A B.
118, 123(1939); Am. Export Airlines, Transatlantic Operations, 2 C.A.B.
16 (1940); Am. Export Airlines, Temporary Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity (New York-Foynes Service), 3 C.A.B. 294,
298(1941); North Atlantic Certificate Renewal Case, 15 C.A.B. 1053,
1113-20(1951).
23. THOMAS, ECONOMIC RFGULATION OF ScHDIULED AiR TRANSroau

(1951 67-68, 225, n. 154); Pan American Airways (Nev.), New Zealand
Operations, 1 C.A.A. 695, 711-12(1939); the Pacific Case, 7 C.A.B. 209,
228-29(1946) involved a proposal to operate dirigibles across the Pacific
to Japan and Australia.
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uisite "experience" to demonstrate fitness and ability. Maritime carriers, such as the Moore-McCormack Company have
been consistently rejected by the Board on this ground and
24
others.
Inasmuch as a company can readily gather trained personnel and can gain actual experience in a variety of ways,
the recent decisions by the Board have stressed the commercial significance of "experience" as an element of fitness
and ability. For example, North East Airlines applied for a
North Atlantic route at the end of World War IL The airline
had operated charter flights for the military services across
the North Atlantic routes during the war. In its presentation to the Board it stressed its actual operating experience
over the route in question. The Board rejected this narrow
technical construction of the doctrine of "experience" and
held that an applicant must demonstrate the commercial
significance of his experience. 25 Other than "general experience" the Board presently stresses four factors in determining fitness and ability:
(1)

The carrier must have a strong financial base;

(2) The carrier must have an established sales organization;
(3)

The nature of the carrier's existing service must not
conflict with the nature of the proposed service.

(4) The carrier must be able to provide equipment appropriate to the standard of service on the route.
24. Northeast Airlines, Inc., et at., North Atlantic Route Case, 6 C.A.B.
319, 341, 342 (1945); Additional Service to Latin America, 6 C.A.B.
857, 902-04(1946); South Atlantic Air Route Case, 7 C.A.B. 285, 305
(1946).
25. North Atlantic Route Case, supra,n.24; North Atlantic Certificate
Renewal Case, supra note 22 at 1120. When the postwar route cases
were opened, a large number of applicants applied. Even though many
of them would never have a chance to become serious contenders for
the routes, in the initial period it was reasonable to assume that some
of the "experienced" troop carriers might receive a route. In that spirit
of good faith many of the hopefuls submitted their applications. There
was one petitioner, however, whose equal in sheer effrontery the C.A.B.
had never seen and probably will never again see. Like something out
of an early Evelyn Waugh novel came U.N. Airships, Inc. With $10,000
capitalization authorized and none paid in, and a one man technical
staff consisting of a retired crop duster, U.N. Airships proposed to
initiate a dirigible service between Washington, D.C. and principal points
of the world. Although the company was perfunctorily rejected as "unfit,"
the lengthy recitation of its proposal in the Board's opinions attests the
fascination of the Board with the strange group. See Pacific Case, 7
C.A.B. 209, 228-29 (1946); American Overseas Airlines et a., South
Atlantic Routes, 7 C.A.B. 285; 291-92, 306 (1946).
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2. FinancialAbility
Of the four criteria there is little doubt that the first has
the greatest "commercial significance." A strong financial
stkucture is essential if the carrier is to effectively compete
in the world of international aviation which is beset by overcapacity and destructive competition. A recent Presidential
Task Force study of the problems of aviation emphasized
that the major task facing the Board today was to develop
self-sustaining carriers. 2 Staff evaluation of the major in"ternational routes has indicated a concurrence.2 7 And the
'decisions by the Board have frequently stressed the need28 to
place American air carriers on a sound financial basis.
3.

Sales Organization

It is of course important to note that the first criterion is
in the nature of a goal, whereas the second, the established
sales -organization, is in the nature of an existing fact. The
cases speak of a preference for a carrier with an "established" sales organization as contrasted with a "minimal"
sales organization. 29 This terminology would lead an observer to believe that as with the technical staff of the
earlier days that a carrier could fulfill the requirements if
his sales.staff were "readily expandible." However, this is
not what the board means. "Established" is used in the
26. Project Horizon, at 24; compare Bluestone, at 20, 24, 28-30;
Keyes, A Reconsiderationof FederalControl of Entry Into Air Transport,
22 J.Am L.&CoMM. 192, 202(1955).
27. United States-South America Route Investigation, Docket 12895,
Order E-17289, August 8, 1961, at 3 (Mimeograph copy) [By order No.
E-19792, July 9, 1963 the scope of the investigation was widened and
the name of the proceedings changed to United States-Caribbean-South
American Investigation]; North Atlantic Route Renewal Case, Docket
13577, Order E-18301, May 4, 1962, at 11, 12 (Mimeograph copy). (All
page references will hereafter be to the pagination of the mimeograph
copies of the Staff Studies accompanying the orders.)
28. North Atlantic Certificate Renewal Case, 15 C.A.B. 1053, 1115-17,
1121(1951); New York-Balboa Through Service Proceedings (Reopened),
18 C.A.B. 501, 1502(1954); 20 C.A.B. 493(1954); Buffalo-Toronto Route
Case, Docket 7142 et al., Orders E-17830, E-17381, November 3, 1961,
at 3 (Mimeograph copy). The Air Transport Board of Canada denied
Eastern's application. Wall Street Journal, January 14, 1963, p. 14,
col. 3. The importance of finance on criteria for the award of foreign
air routes cannot be overemphasized. It provides the motivation for
more C.A.B. policies than any other consideration. See, route planning
and strengthening the weak carrier, discussed infra.
29. Northeast Airlines, Inc. et al., North Atlantic Route Case, 6
C.A.B. 319, 342(1946); Additional Service to Latin America, 6 C.A.B.
857, 881 (1946); Boston-Bermuda Case, 9 C.A.B. 563, 568(1948); New
York-Nassau Case, 24 C.A.B. 245, 264(1956).
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sense of "established contacts." Thus, the decisions discuss
the necessity of a carrier having a "sense of identity" or
"historic identity"3 0 with the foreign market that the carrier
wishes to serve. Illustrative of this connotation is the present
situation of Braniff Airways in South America. Although
Braniff had a large sales organization as part of its domestic
route system prior to its award of a South American route,
simple numerical expansion of the organization to cover its
foreign terminals has not been sufficient to generate traffic
sufficient to support the route. A recent staff study concluded
that the reason for this was that Braniff lacked a sense of
"identity" with the routes and therefore could not obtain
adequate traffic.3 1
4. Conflicts of Interest
A third consideration in determining fitness is the all
important necessity of avoiding conflicts of interest which
will impede the development of the national system of air
transportation.3 2 In the field of foreign air commerce there
have been two prominent areas of conflict: (1) the conflict
between local traffic and long haul traffic, and (2) the
conflict inherent in the combination of air and surface carriage.
In certain of the Board's cases it has been governed by
an apprehension that a carrier engaged in one phase of air
transportation might not be a satisfactory carrier in another.
Under the Board's policies from the very first a distinction
was made between the "trunk" carriers who specialize in
the carriage of traffic over long distances and the "feeder"
lines which specialize in funneling local traffic to the long
haul traffic centers. 33 Paralleling the doctrines in domestic
air transport, the Board held that in foreign air transportation, local traffic should be served by local carriers. The rationale of the early cases was cloudy. Initially, the cases seem
to turn on the idea that pioneer local lines should not be sub30. Florida-Mexico City Service Case, Docket 2811 et al., Order E17349, July 21, 1961, at 10 (Mimeograph copy); Buffalo-Toronto Route
Case, supra note 28, at 7, 9.
31. United States-South America Route Investigation, supra, note 27,
at 25.
32. Westwood, at 20, 41, 46.
33. Fulda CompETION IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRmEs (1961), §§7.8
7.16, 7.17; Hector, at 941; Westwood, at 24-25, 42; Note, Merger and
Monopoly in Domesti Aviation Cases, 62 CoLuM.L.REv. 851, 866 n. 116
(1962).
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jected to competition from powerful mainland companies,
and in an attempt to justify this feeling the Board began
to develop a policy which would allow it to keep the large
companies out.38 These cases of course were not applicable
where no existing local carriers had to be protected. Extending concepts found in the domestic cases, the Board decided
that the mixing of route awards for local traffic to long
haul carriers would lead to a conflict of interest. A carrier
whose business was primarily long haul traffic, as an international carrier's business predominately is, might emphasize
"milk-run" flights instead of nonstop flights. Or where
the need was for short haul service, the carrier whose business was primarily long haul might neglect the development
of the short haul service. 5 The policy of the Board was
clarified in the Latin American Case36 when it was faced
with a choice of carrier for service between New York and
Bermuda. The two applicants for the route were American
Overseas and Colonial. American Overseas wished to operate
the route as part of its transatlantic service; Colonial as tin
extension of its New York City-Washington, D.C., service.
The Board chose Colonial, noting:
American Overseas would necessarily be interested in
the development of its long-haul service to European
points and we believe therefore that the additional United
States Service should be placed in the hands of a compar1y
whose interest will be devoted primarily to the develop37
ment of the local traffic.
As one critic of the Board's policies observed, the question
of experience was passed by. American Overseas obviously
was the more experienced of the two in international transport. The real point made was that the Board would prefer
that carrier which, because of its route lay-out, would be
unable to do anything except concentrate op the development of the traffic in question.38
D4. Alaska Airlines, Inc. et al., Service to Anchorage, Alaska, 3
C.A.B. 522, 528 (1942); Pan American World Airways Caribbean
Atlantic Airlines, Inc., Puerto Rican Operations, 3 C.A.B. 717 (1942);
Pacific Case, 7 C.A.B. 209, 234 (1946).
35. Westwood, at 27, 41, 45.
36. 6 C.A.B. 857(1946).
37. Id. at 888.
38 Westwood, at 42; cf., Pan American Airways, Ine. - Domestic
Route Case, 11 C.A.B. 852 (1950). Pan American was required to
remain an international air transport specialist. But see, Northgast
Airlines, North Atlantic Route Case, 6 C.A.B. 319, 342(1945).
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The second area of conflict is found in the combination of
carriers to provide a liew travel service which would complement each carrier's individual mode of carriage. This
has most frequently taken the form of a dual sales agency
between a maritime carrier and an air carrier to offer an
"air-sea"' service. Under the terms of the act the Board
must approve these combinations as part of its determination
of public convenience and necessity.3 9 The test of public
interest is whether the agreement will enable "the carrier
other than the air carrier to use aircraft to public advantage
in its operations and will not restrain competition.140

The

Board is further warned not to approve any consolidation,
merger, lease, purchase, or operating contract "which would
result in monopoly or monopolies.1 41 Because the inquiry
must delve into the character of the applicant as well as into
the general economic conditions of their area's competition,
the Board in granting or withholding approval is in effect
making a determination of the general fitness of the carriers.
Such approval has rarely been forthcoming on the general
grounds that such arrangements have inherent within them
conflicts of interests that would damage the development of
the national system of air transportation. 42 A typical rejected agreement is illustrated by Pan American's venture
with Matson Steam Co.43 The basic provisions were that

the two companies would set up a jointly owned sales agency,
Inter Island, which would act as Pan American's exclusive
agent in American Samoa, Fiji, New Zealand, and Australia.
Pan American also agreed that it would conduct no more
flights from the West Coast to Hawaii and beyond except
when such operations were necessary for adequate through
service. The Board struck down the agreement (in effect
finding Matson and Inter Island unfit) on the grounds that
39. §§401, 408; 49 U.S.C.A. §§1371, 1378(1958); Pan American Airways v. C.A.B., 121 F.2d 810, 815 (2d Cir. 1941). See Bagget, Are
Surface Carriers Grounded by Law?, 31 VA.L.REv. 337(1945); Hickey,
Surface Carrier Participation in Air Transportation Under the Civil

Aeronautics Act, 36 GEo.L.J. 125, 144-53(1948); Tomlinson, Surface Carrier Participation in Air Transportation, 34 GEo.LJ. 64, 71 (1946).

Note, Restrctions on the Entry of Surface Carriers Seeking to Fly, 71
YALE L.J. 1461 (1962).
40. §408 (b), 49 U.S.C.A. §1378 (b) (1948).
41. See Note 40 supra.

42. This again demonstrates the confusion of issues inherent in the

selection of a carrier. See American President Lines, Ltd. et al., Petition, 7 C.A.B. 799, 800-01(1947).
43. Pan American Airways, Inc. - Pan American-Matson Inter
Island Contract, 3 C.A.B. 540 (1942).
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such a restraint of competition would retard the development
of a system of air transportation adequately adapted to the
present and future lneeds of the nation and that there was
the possibilty of an impasse in the jointly owned company
which could retard its activities in aviation.4
In subsequent decisions the Board more fully developed
its views on the character of the agency in avoiding conflicts of interest. When Pan American attempted to name
the United States Lines its exclusive agent in Europe, the
Board noted that "There is nothing unusual in the use of
an agent by an airline." 45 What made this agency different
from the ordinary one was "the size of the territory covered
and the fact that the agent is a competitor." 48 Such an exclusive agency was undesirable because it reduced the control
of the carrier over his operations and exposed the carrier
to manipulation by a competing transportation interest. In
denying the application the Board concluded: "When, in addition, the size of the area covered by an exclusive agency is
so great as to account for a substantial part of the carrier's
income the influence of the agent is magnified.1 4

Thus construed the act would seem to prohibit almost all
air-surface transport agency agreements on the ground, that
the inherent conflict of interest would damage the development of the United States air transportation industry. The
Board, however, took especial care in an earlier case, which
had denied a surface carrier's application to enter into foreign
air transportation, to clarify the issue with the statement:
"As construed by the Board this requires that the proposed
service shall be auxiliary to or supplemental of the surface
carrier's operation.14? In practice the same principle has
applied to air-surface transport agency agreements.
The factual test to be met is whether the proposed agency
would account for A "substantia! part" of the air carrier's
business. For example, the agreement between Northwest
44. Id. at 546-548.
45. Pan American Airways, Inc. - United States Lines Co. Agreoment, 8 C.A.B. 609, 612 (1947).
46. Id.
47. id. at 613.
48. Acquisition of Taca, S.A., by American Export Lines, 3 C.A.B.
216 (1944); American Export Lines, Control of American Export Airlines, 3 C.A.B. 619 (1942); 4 C.A.B. 106, 112 (1943). Note, Restrictiov.
on the Entry of Surface Carriers Seeking to Fly, 71 YALE LJ. 1461,
1532-38 (1962).
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Airlines and American President Lines 49 provided that each,
would solicit traffic for the other but that neither would,
have an exclusive agency in any city where both had a sales
office. The evidence was that the purpose of the agreement
was to obtain adequate solicitation of traffic for Northwest
at off-line points where it did not have sales offices and
that the amount of business expected to be acquired would.
not be a substantial part of the air carrier's business. 50 In
approving this particular agreement the Board nevertheless
did not abandon its fears that a harmful conflict of interest
might later arise which would call for dissolution of the
agency relationship. The Board issued its caveat, saying:
If in the performance of this agreement it should develop that Northwest was actually 'relying substantially
upon the services of President Lines for solicitation of
traffic over its international routes, there would then
be presented a situation comparable to that which calledfor disapproval of prior agency agreements... .
In a similar way the Board rejected attempts of surface
carriers to enter air commerce. 'The arguments by the surface carriers were that air carriage was the product of
the natural evolution of surface carriage; therefore, these
surface carriers should be allowed to progress into air carriers . 2 Stressing the advantages of ai-sea service, in a
turnabout fashion they argued that they should be protected
from the harmful competition by the air carriers during the
swing from surface to air travel.53 In language similar to
that employed in rejecting the air-sea carrier contracts the
Board rejected the surface carrier's arguments, saying that
this conflict of interest was incompatible with the progress of
air transport. The Board stated at length:
The applicants who propose such a tilan are confronted
by independent air carrier applicants dedicated solely
to the advancement of air transportation and bent on
It
selling air travel not one way but both ways..
46. Northwest Airlines, Inc. - American President Lines, Agreqment, 9 C.A.B. 336 (1948).
50. Id. at 338.
51. Ibid.
52. Northeast Airlines, Inc., No~th Atlantic Route Case, 6 C.A.B. 319,
341, 342 (1945); Additional Service to Latin America, 6 C.A.B. 857,
902 (1946).
53. See note 52, supra.
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-would be expecting too much to assume that a transportation company engaged in both air and sea transportation would be in a position to provide vigorous .competition between its air transportation and its surface
transportation on this route. Nor would it be reasonable
to suppose that in any conflict of interest between their
two transportation arms the issue would be resolved in'
favor of the air arm with its relatively small inveltment
and against its sea transportation with relatively large
* investment to support. . . . In such circumstances the
-transportation activities offering the larger investment
interest may be expected to dominate in any competitive
conflict between the two .... 54
Thus in this situation, as in the others, the danger, according to the Board, was that in a conflict of interest situation
the more powerful party would seek to protect itself and
this would give that party an undue competitive advantage
which would be harmful to the public interest.
5. Equipment
The fourth factor, equipment, rarely enters into a deteruination of fitness and ability. The answer is readily available. If a carrier satisfies the previous two requirements,
the carrier will be able to provide whatever equipment is
needed to fly the route. This was not always the case in
the early days of international aviation where the proper
equipment had not become standardized as it has been today.
Nevertheless, there have been occasional cases where inadequate equipment caused the Board to find the applicant
unfit to provide service appropriate to the route under consideration. For example, where Mackey Airlines proposed

to fly. the highly competitive New York-Nassau route with
relatively slow, non-pressurized DC-4 equipment and all other
carriers on the route were.using modern DC-6B and DC-7
equipment, the Board rejected Mackey's application. 55 In
54. Additional Service to Latin America, 6 C.A.B. 857, 903-04 (1946);
Hawaiian Airlines, Ltd. ot al.,.Hawaiian Case 7 C.A.B 83 108 (1946).
.'55. New York-Nassau Case, 24 C.A.B. 245, 261 (i956); Caribbean
Area Case, 9 C.A.B. 534, 543 (1948). In Caribbean Investigation, 4
C.A.B. 199 (1942), the Board refused to grant- foreign, air routes to
domestic carriers on the ground that they .would have hindered the
w~r effort by shifting their limited amounts of equipment from domestic
tW international service. Compare Transatlantic Cargo Case, 21 C.A.B.
671, 673 (1954); North Atlantic Certificate Renewal Case, 15 C.A.B.
10,53, 1121 (1951); Pacific-.Case, -7 C.A.B. 209, 228-29 (1947); Florida: I
Mexico City Service Case, supra note 30, at 9.
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the investigation of the South American routes Braniff's inability to provide up-to-date equipment is singled out as one
reason for failure to obtain an adequate share of the market.Pe
C.

WILLINGNESS

1. Attitude of the Ar.picant -

Pioneering

In its simplest sense "willingness" to fly a particular route
is inferred from the carrier's application itself. And were
this the case, it would naturally follow that the Board might
have evolved a doctrine whereby the most "willing" applicant
would be the one with priority in point of time in filing
for the route. The Board, however, has wisely avoided the
simplest sense of the statutory criterion of "willingness."
It has specifically rejected the previously mentioned argument with the statement that "To award a certificate cQvering a particular route upon the basis of priority of application might result in an operation entirely contrary to the.
public interest." 57 What has emerged as the contours of the
criterion is that the carrier shows that it is "cognizant of
the problems confronting it in meeting the rules, regulations
and requirements pertaining to air carrier operations and
has displayed a desire to cooperate in every respect in accomplishing the ends sought . . ."5 It is apparent that the
Board was demanding more than casual compliance with its
policies by an applicant. The standard implied effort beyond
the minimum if a carrier was to be chosen to fly the route.
Thus in the case in which the Board first grappled with
the problems of "willingness," it compared the standard of
service of the competing carriers.5 0 One had a record of reliability with a high record of on time departures and landings. It had exceeded the minimum standards for electronic
equipment. The other applicant, to the contrary, had a record
of irregular and undependable service with frequent sus-'
pensions of service. According to the examiner, the one
56. United States-South America Route Investigation, supra note 27.
67. Coptinental Airlines, Mandatory Route, 1 C.A.A. 88, 101 (1939);
Braniff Airways, Houston-Memphis-Louisville Route, 2 C.A.B. 353, 387
(1940); but of. Additional Service to Latin America, 6 C.A.B. 857,
914 (194G); Westwood, 51-52.
68. Pan American Airways, Inc. - Caribbean-Atlantic Airlines, Inc.;
Puerto Rican Operations, 3 C.A.B. 717, 729 (1942). For the Board's
policy toward a carrier who fails to inaugurate service over an awarded*
route see note 78, infra.
59. Pan American Airways, Inc. - Caribbean-Atlantic Airlines, Puerto
Rican Operations, 3 C.A.B. 717 (1942).
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interest of this applicant was to technically meet the regulations. In choosing the first applicant for the route and
rejecting the second the Board stated, "A desire to comply
technically with the regulations does not indicate that type
of management which can be relied upon to advance the air
transportation industry."6 0
Analogous to this reasonable requirement that a carrier
make a positive effort to comply with the regulations of the
Board is the important doctrine of "pioneering." Historically,
it apparently arose from statements by the Board in the
early cases where it referred to the "pioneer efforts" of
Pan American in the field of international aviation."1 Like
the criterion of the "established sales organization," pioneering seemed to imply that the applicant was more "experienced." Today, the doctrine means that a carrier is permitted to introduce as affirmative evidence of his "willingness" the fact that the carrier has initiated or "pioneered" the
development of a route. For example, in the postwar route
cases, especially The North Atlantic Route Case, Pan American was given special consideration because it was the American "pioneer" in international aviation across the North Atlantic. (2 In recent years the doctrine has been most important
where the Board was faced with a choice between applicants
for a particular route. In these situations the doctrine has
meant that the Board will prefer the applicant that has made
the proportionately greater effort toward the establishment
of the route. 3 For example, in the Florida-Mexico City Service Case,64 the Board granted Pan American a route from
Miami and Tampa to Mexico City in preference to National
Airlines and Eastern Airlines on the ground that Pan Amer60. Id. at 728-29.
61. Alaska Airlines, Service to Alaska, 3 C.A.B. 522, 528 (1942).
62. Northeast Airlines, Inc. et al., North Atlantic Route Case, 6
C.A.B. 319, 343 (1945); Additional Service to Latin America, 6 C.A.B.
857, 901 (1946); Pacific Case, 7 C.A.B. 209, 229 (1946).
63. Western Air Express, Great Falls-Lethbridge Operation, 2 C.A.B.
425, 433 (1940); Pan American Airways, Inc. - Caribbean-Atlantic Airlines, Puerto Rican Operation, 3 C.A.B. 717, 729 (1942); Additional
Service to Latin America, 6 C.A.B. 857 (1946), where it was noted
that "Braniff had deep interest in the establishment of service to South
America." Id. at 914. For a criticism concerning the dangers of manufactured evidence, see Westwood at 51. See, Trans-Pacific Route Case,
Docket 7723 et al., Order E-16286, December 7, 1960; Order E-17230,
April 26, 1961; TWA, Inc., India-Bangkok-Manila Extension, 24 C.A.B.
287, 308 (1956); Alaska Route Modification, 17 C.A.B. 943, 968 (1953).
64. Supra n. 30.
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ican was a "pioneer" in the development of the Mexico City
route. 85
One aspect of the doctrine is not likely to appear again.
This is the situation where there is actually only one carrier
who has pioneered and there are other carriers who have
applied for international routes. The problem is whether
preference should be automatically granted to the lone
pioneer. This question was presented to the Board shortly
after World War II.66 Deciding in favor of a system of
competitive routes, the Board avoided inconsistency with
the pioneer doctrine as it is known today by holding that
the principle of pioneering need not be confined to the efforts
of a carrier in the development of a particular international
route; the same principle, the Board thought, might operate
in favor of a carrier in the field generally without reference
to a particular route.6 7 Under this rationale of pioneering
Trans World Airlines was recognized as a "pioneer in the
domestic operation of long-range four-engine aircraft." 68
The Board also noted that TWA had entered into an extensive program of study and planning and had "energetically
sought to lay a sound foundation for the operation of a successful international service."6 9 As a result of this general
pioneering TWA was awarded extensive routes both in the
North Atlantic and the Middle East service areas.
2. Color of Title
Where there has been actual participation in the development of the route, the force of the doctrine becomes much
stronger. In many cases the Board has indicated that the
carrier has what amounts to a vested right in the route.
In the first postwar international case, The North Atlantic
Route Case,70 the Board selected American Export Airlines
for a route on the grounds of its investment and its developmental work, which it said "would entitle it [American Export] to serious consideration" even though it had no "legally
enforceable claim : ' 71 Ten years later they were seemingly
65. Id. at 10.
66. Northeast Airlines, Inc. et al., North Atlantic Route Case, 6
C.A.B. 319 (1945).
67. Id. at 344.
68. Id.
69. Id.; compare Additional Service to Latin America, 6 C.A.B. 857,
914 (1946).
70. 6 C.A.B. 319 (1945).
71. ld. at 343.
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determined that this type of pioneering would give the carrier a "legally enforceable claim." The issue before the
Board was the choice of carrier to provide nonstop service
between New York and Mexico City.72 Pan American applied
for the route, as did Eastern Airlines which was already certificated to serve the route on a multi-stop basis via Washington and New Orleans. 73 The Board selected Eastern, saying:
"We have in the past given some preference to the carrier
which operates via intermediate points between points where
the grant of a nonstop route is contemplated."7 4 The preference was not as great when the carrier had not actually developed the route, the Board continued; however, this latter
consideration was immaterial in the instant proceeding because by virtue of the previously vetoed nonstop route Eastern
75
had "color of title" to the route.
"Color of title" had apparently motivated C.A.B. decisions
in other contexts even though the term has not been mentioned.
In overseas service cases involving certification of longhaul carriers to serve local traffic, the Board refused to
allow the long-haul carriers to participate in local traffic
because the local carriers must be allowed "to retain the
more lucrative local business so they can continue to serve
the needs of those areas in Alaska where business is less
profitable." 76 In a subsequent case involving similar considerations of local traffic the Board excluded the local carriers completely and allowed the long-haul carriers to serve
local traffic.
The statement of Chairman Warner in dissent seems to
be nothing less than an argument for the concept of "color
of title":
The present operations of each of these carriers represent a substantial monetary investment, and the investment of several years of the lives of men who have
chosen to devote themselves to the development of air
72. New York-Mexico City Case, 25 C.A.B. 323 (1957).
73. Eastern's nonstop route had been vetoed by the President in 1946.
Id. at 347. See Additional Service to Latin America, 6 C.A.B. 857
(1946).
74. Id. at 331, citing Eastern Route Consolidation, 25 C.A.B. 215
(1967).
'7L Instant Case at 331.
76. Alaska Airlines, Inc. et al., Service to Anchorage, Alaska, 3 C.A.B.
522, 528 (1942). See discussion of conflict of interest, supra.
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transportation in Puerto Rico and the surrounding area.
I cannot concur in a decision which sweeps away the
work of one of these carriers, through a denial of the
right to continue upon any portion of the routes heretofore served.
. . . (T)he total exclusion of one of the carriers from
all future participation in the field ... appears to impose such a hardship upon a long-established enterpise
7
as . . to be, in my opinion, highly undesirable.7
The doctrine of pioneering has also been successfully used
7
as an affirmative defense. In the Chicago-Mexico City Case 8
Braniff applied for American Airlines' route between the
two cities, which American had never been able to put into
service because of the failure of the State Department to
acquire additional capacity in the treaty negotiations. The
Board denied Braniff's application on the ground inter alia
that American had a better claim to the route by virtue of
the prior award. Even though American had never instituted service, the Board reasoned that the benefit of American's pioneering would be lost by transferring the route to
Braniff.70 It is important to note that the Board is not
speaking simply of a carrier's affirmative efforts to implement a route. Beyond them, the Board seems to be concerned
with the carrier's "identity" in the market. Thus, in the
Trans-Pacific Route Case8 0 the Board in opening the east
coast to direct service to the Orient, refused to allow Pan
American to serve the Baltimore-Washington area on the
grounds that Pan American was not a pioneer in the development of traffic to the Orient from these terminals, whereas
Northwest had spent a number of years promoting eastwest flights.8 ' Similar considerations prompted the C.A.B.
in the Caribbean Area Case.82 In the reshuffling of the
Latin American routes in 1946 Pan American had lost its
77. Pan American Airways, Inc. - Caribbean-Atlantic Airlines, Inc.,
Puerto Rican Operation, 3 C.A.B. 717, 731 (1942).
78. 25 C.A.B. 464 (1957).
79. Id. at 466. Failure to inaugurate service due to circumstances
beyond the control of the carrier will not result in the loss of a certificate of public convenience and necessity. Additional Service to Latin
America, 8 C.A.B. 65 (1948); Delta-Chicago & Southern Airlines Merger
Case, 16 C.A.B. 647, 687 (1952). For discussion of treaty problems,
see note 127, infra.
80. Supra note 63.
81. Id.
82. 9 C.A.B. 534 (1948).
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stop at Aruba. Two years later it applied for a transfer
of its intermediate stop from Coro to Aruba on its San JuanCaracas flight. The Board granted the request, saying that
Pan American would be able "to recapture" its "historic
share" of the traffic at Aruba.ss
Whether the doctrine is viable is difficult to answer after
the decision in the Service to Puerto Rico Case. 4 Decided
in the same year as the New York-Mexico City Case, supra,
its actual situation was strikingly similar to the latter case,
but its results were completely at conflict. The routes in
question were from Puerto Rico to the interior points of the
United States. Delta and Eastern applied for the ChicagoSan Juan route. Delta claimed preference for the route on
the basis of its route via New Orleans to San Juan. If
"color of title" had been applied Delta would have been
selected. However, both the examiner and the majority failed
to mention the doctrine and turned the decision on grounds
of strengthening the weak carrier. 85 There being no evidence
that Delta would be strengthened by the award, the application was denied.80
The inconsistency among these decisions, however, is not
the main concern. The real question is how "color of title"
ever was allowed to creep into the Board's decisions. As the
term has been used, it means that a carrier has what amounts
to a vested right in certain routes that it has "pioneered."
Yet, it is an elementary principle of law that a license, such
as a certificate of public convenience and necessity, confers
a privilege on the licensee which may be withdrawn or revoked. 1 This is clearly the policy of the Federal Aviation
Act which declares: "No certificate shall confer any proprietary, property, or exclusive right in the use of any airspace,
Federal airway, landing area, or navigation facility."8' 8 The
reason for such a principle is manifest: The ultimate weapon
that a public service agency has to compel compliance with
83. Id.

at

545;

TWA, Inc.,

India-Bangkok-Manila

Extension,

24

C.A.B. 287, 304 (1950) ; but cf., Pan American Airways, Inc. - Domestic
Route Case, 10 C.A.B. 852, 883, 933-34 (1950); Trans-Pacific Certificate
Renewal Case, 20 C.A.B. 493, 498 (1954).
84. 26 C.A.B. 72 (1957).
85. Id. at 76, 152. "Strengthening the Weak Carrier" is discussed

infra.
86. Id. at 76, 81, 152.

87. See DAVIS, AnmrimsTRA V LAW TRnATISE §§7.16, 7.17 (1958).
88. §401(i) ; 49 U.S.C.A. §1371(i) (1958).
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its regulations is withdrawal of the franchise. Since the
C.A.B. has virtually no other means of regulating standards
of service in international air transport,8 9 a fortiori the
Board must rely on the threat of withdrawing a franchise as
its chief weapon. 90 But as the Board's careless use of the
language indicates, the C.A.B. would seemingly deny itself
this fundamental power.
The administrative process may not be, strictly speaking,
a judicial process, but the need for clear and definite statements of policy is no less pressing. 91 Under any system employing the principles of rational analysis, it would be indefensible for a policy-maker to promulgate a standard which
the authorizing statute in essence and in express terms clearly
forbids. Where there is no judicial review available even
to correct errors of law, as there is none here, the duty to
avoid erroneous interpretations is even stronger. The litigants have a right to expect a logical coherence of the Board's
decisions. From their viewpoint, which reflects that of the
public interest as well, it is indefensible for the C.A.B. in one
month of the year to proclaim a new criterion and in another
month to treat the utterance as lapsus linguae.
The problem remains, however, of what grounds on which
to base the decision. It would seem that within the statutory
standards that the Board could - and indeed should - find
clear and definite standards under which it could base the
decision. Prominent among these criteria are those which
evaluate a carrier in terms of his "experience" in the field,
his "identity" in the market (ability to generate traffic),
or in terms of improving an existing service. Time and fact
sustain the reasonableness of these criteria. For example, the
89. Withdrawal of a certificate of public and convenience and necessity is the Board's ultimate weapon. The Board may bring indirect
pressures on a carrier to improve service by authorizing competitive

service on the route. See notes 343, 347 and 348 infra and accompanying

text.

90. Compare American Airlines Inc., Chicago-Detroit Local Service
Case, 20 C.A.B. 505 (1955); afrd sub nom., Lake Central Airlines v.
C.A.B., 239 F.2d 46, 50 (D.C.Cir. 1956). The C.A.B. refused to renew a cer-

tificate of public convenience and necessity even when legislation was

pending that would have granted the carrier the advantage of permanent
certification. [Since this article was written the Board once again

demonstrated its power to refuse to renew a franchise where the existing
service is not beneficial to the public convenience and necessity. Deficitridden Northeast Airlines lost the New York-Florida run in the New YorkFlorida Renewal Case, Docket 12285 et al., Order E-19910, August 15,
1963.]
91. Friendly, spra note 10, at 874.
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Board has set forth the policy that "in absence of a showing
that the service of one company would be more in the public
interest, the carrier which has been providing more service
and generating more traffic should receive the authoriza-

tion." 92 Following logically from this was the Board's statement in the New York-Mexico City Case to the effect that a
carrier who serves a route on a multi-stop basis should be preferred when nonstop service is proposed between the termini
of the route,98 a policy which encompasses the realistic considerations of "experience" and "identity." Surely, anything
would be preferable to the Board's marrying the relatively
simple requirement of willingness to provide service with the
criterion of fitness to bring forth the nulius filius of "color of
title." Such a careless attitude toward administrative standards can hardly generate confidence in the administrative
process. The danger is, as numerous writers have charged,
that the lack of standards creates a situation where influence
peddlers are bound to rush in.94 The sad record of exercise of
executive prerogative in the field of foreign air route awards
serves only to confirm the truth of the indictment.9 8
III.

PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY
A.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Section 401 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 prohibits
any air carrier from engaging in air transportation unless
there is in force a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing service over the route.9 6 Properly viewed, the
criteria of public convenience and necessity are designed to
determine whether service should be instituted between the
points on the route without consideration of which carrier
should be chosen to provide the service, although in practice
the issues are often confused and mingled.9 7 The general
meaning of the terms, which have been employed frequently
in statutes regulating public utilities, 98 is that some general
92. Alaska Route Modification Case, 17 C.A.B. 943, 968 (1953). See
notes 391-396 infra and accompanying text for suggested rationale of
instant case.
93. 25 C.A.B. 323, 331 (1957).
94. Friendly, supra note 10, at 880-81; Hector, supra note 9, at 954,
988-89.
95. Landis, supra note 21, at 14, 43-44; See Note 127 infra.
96. §401; 49 U.S.C.A. §1371 (1958).
97. Landis, supra note 21.
98. Northeast Airlines, Duluth-Twin Cities Operation, 1 C.A.A. 573,
576 (1940); cf. American-Eastern Merger, Docket 13355, November 27,
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public good should be advanced. 9 What is "expedient" can
be considered a "necessity;'"10o and what is "suitable and
fitting to the public need" meets the definition of "convenience" '10 1 Considered together, and the two are not used
separately, 10 2 the terms signify "a reasonable public convenience which would meet a reasonable public need."' 0 3
The terms are obviously elastic and give a regulatory
agency wide discretionary power in determining what is or
is not the public convenience. Considering the foreign air
transportation industry with its far-flung routes scattered
over the world, it might be thought that the C.A.B. would
have unlimited discretionary power in the award of certificates. 10 4 Certain limitations, however, supposedly prevent
arbitrary decisions. These are (1) the statutory criteria of
the Federal Aviation Act and (2) the factual criteria which
have developed from the many cases decided under the act.
B.

THE STATUTORY POLICIES

Fundamental to an understanding of the concepts of public
convenience and necessity in foreign air commerce is that
transportation and communication are factors that shape national policy; and at the same time they are well adapted
to being used as instruments of national policy. 05 That national policy is of more importance in foreign air commerce
than in domestic air commerce has been frequently recognized
by the C.A.B. 1O That Congress recognized the necessity of
emphasizing the national interest is illustrated by its command to the Board to consider the following criteria as being
1962 (Examiner's decision); American Export Airlines, Transatlantic
Serv., 2 C.A.B. 16, 30 (1940); but ef. Caribbean Area Case, 9 C.A.B.
534, 549 (1949); Delta-Chicago & So. Merger Case, 16 C.A.B. 647,

651 (1952).

See Bagget, "Are Surface Carriers Grounded by Law?",

31 VA.L.REV. 337 (1945).
99. Seaboard Airline R.R. Co. v. Wells, 100 Fla. 1027, 130 So. 587

(1931).
100. Wabash, Chicago and West. R.R. Co. v. Commerce Comm. ex rel.
Jefferson S. W. R.R. Co., 309 111.
412, 141 N.E. 212 (1924).
101. Abbot v. Public Util. Comm., 48 R.I. 196, 136 At. 490 (1927).
102. Re Aldrich, New York Pub. Util. Comm., P.U.R. 1923A, 385.
103. Re McCartney, Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm., P.U.R. 1928C, 182.

104. Editorial, What is Public Convenience and Necessity?, 11 J. Amt

L. & Coh. 163 (1940).

105. LISSITZYN, INTERNATIONAL Am TRANSPORT AND NATIONAL POLICY

18 (1942) [hereinafter cited as, LIssiTzYN].
106. E.g., Pan Am. Airways (Nev.), New Zealand Operation, 1 C.A.
695, 703 (1939); North Atlantic Certificate Renewal Case, 15 C.A.B.
1053, 1104 (1951); South Atlantic Renewal Case, 19 C.A.B. 276 (1954);
Bluestone, at 6-11.
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in the public interest and in accordance with public convenience and necessity:
(a) The encouragement and development of an air
transportation system properly adapted to the present
and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce
of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the
national defense;
(b) the regulation of air transportation in such manner
as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of,
assure the highest degree of safety in, and foster sound.
economic conditions in, such transportation, and to improve the relations between, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers;
(c) the promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient
service by air carriers at reasonable charges, without
unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages,
or unfair or destructive competitive practices;
(d) competition to the extent necessary to assure the
sound development of an air transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic
commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service,
and of the national defense;
(e) the promotion of safety in air commerce; and
(f) the promotion, encouragement, and development of
10 7
civil aeronautics.
1.

Stimulation of Trade

The thrust of the statute makes it clear that the basic consideration in international aviation is the stimulation of
trade.108 As a means of rapid transport and communication,
the airplane is unsurpassed in this competitive age as a stimulator of international commerce.' 09 As the Board recognized
in an early decision granting a route from California to New
Zealand, "the proposed route is not simply a line of communication between San Francisco and Auckland but is a
means of commercial contact between the North American
continent and the entire Australasia section of the world." l0
107. §102; 49 U.S.C.A. §1302 (1958).
108. South Atlantic Renewal Case, supra note 106, at 283.
109. LissiTzYN, at 14.

110. Pan American Airways (Nev.), New Zealand Operation, supra
note 106, at 705.
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In 1961 Project Horizon confirmed the importance of air
transportation in international trade, stating:
The commercial air transport has, over the years,
made increasing contributions to the national economy.
It has stimulated commerce, promoted travel, helped to
develop remote areas, and radically reduced the amount
of time spent by important segments of the population
in getting from one place to anotheril"
It must be emphasized, however, that when the Act speaks
of the stimulation of commerce, it doees not use the terms in
a narrowly commercial sense but within the context of international aviation as an instrument of national governmental
policy to promote the diplomatic and military interests of
the United States abroad as well as to provide a bridge of
commerce for its citizens. 1 2 Project Horizon has proclaimed
that "continued U.S. pre-eminence in international air transport is unquestionably in the national interest.""13 One
writer has even suggested that the development of an American national system of air transport is not likely to be
achieved if air transport is left entirely in the hands of
private enterprise. 114
2.

National Defense and Diplomatic Needs

Emphasis on the national aspects of public convenience and
necessity is found in the mandate to the Board to consider
the needs of the national defense." 5 The premise of the
Board's decisions in this area is that the civilian air force
is to the military force what the merchant marine is to the
navy. 1 From this it follows that it is in the best interests
of the national defense to encourage the development of cargo
and supplemental carriers which can quickly be pressed into
111. Project Horizon, 126.

112. LiSSIzN, at 94; Pan American Airways (Nev.), New Zdaland
Operation, supra note 106, at 705; North Atlantic Certificate Renewal
Case, supra note 106 at 1058, 1105, citing testimony by Paul Hoffman,
President of the Ford Foundation; South Atlantic Renewal Case, supra
note 106 at 283-84, 289.
113. Project Horizon, 24.
114. LIssrTZYN, at 94, 130, 135.
115. §§102(a)

(d),

103, 306, 312; 49 U.S.C.A.

§§1302(a)

(d),

1303,

1347,1353 (1958).
116. Pan American Airways (Del.), Transatlantic Operations, 1 C.A.A.

118, 128 (1939); States-Alaska Case, 20 C.A.B. 791, 842 (1955); Project
Horizon, 24, 100; CLEVELAND, Am TRANSPORT OF WAR, 5, 59, 90-91, 93
(1946); LisSirzYN, 23, 73; Bluestone, at 17-19.
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service in case of a national emergency. 17 Also, a strong
consideration is that "a route cannot be established on the
spur of the moment to meet an emergency situation;" it is
necessary to have the route already in operation, with flight
personnel acquainted with the problems peculiar to the route
so that in case of emergency the route could readily be expanded.' 1 8
Most of the foreign air route cases have been influenced
by national defense considerations in the most general way." 9
For those few which have been decided solely on the grounds
of national defense it appears that the Board was willing to
decide the case on this ground alone only after intervention
from the Department of Defense. 20 Illustrative of this type
of case is the route to South Africa which was originally
granted during World War II on the request of the War
Department and which has subsequently been renewed two
times solely on the grounds of national defense. 1' 1
Similar in concept to the criterion of the needs of the national defense is consideration of the diplomatic needs of
the nation. Almost no cases mention this as a positive factor.
117. American Overseas Airlines, Inc., South Atlantic Routes, 7 C.A.B.
285, 301-303, 805, 309 (1946); but of. United States-Europe-Middle East
Cargo Service Case, 15 C.A.B. 565, 567 (1951), where it was said:
As a matter of policy, we should not authorize services which are
not commercially feasible solely to provide standby equipment and
personnel for the armed forces during emergencies. To do so could
require an almost unlimited number of aircraft to be operated with
great financial drain on the United States Treasury.
The most recent statement on the national defense criteria favors a
less restrictive view, declaring that the requirements should be met "at
the lowest long-run overall cost to the nation." Bluestone, at 17. See
also notes 463 and 487, infra and accompanying text.
118. States-Alaska Case, 20 C.A.B. 791, 842 (1955).
119. E.g., Western Air Express, Great Falls-Lethbridge Operation,
2 C.A.B. 425, 432 (1940); American Airlines, Inc., Temporary Certificate
of Public Convenience and Necessity, 3 C.A.B. 415 (1942) (Mexico
City Operations); Pan American Airways, New Orleans-Guatemala
City Serv., 4 C.A.B. 161, 174 (1943); Caribbean Investigation, 4 C.A.B.
199 (1943); Northeast Airlines, Inc., North Atlantic Route Case, 6
C.A.B. 319 (1945); Additional Service to Latin America, 6 C.A.B.
857 (1946); North Atlantic Route Transfer Case, 11 C.A.B. 676, 678, 679
(1950); see LissITZYN, at 135.
120. Pan American Airways, Africa Serv., 3 C.A.B. 32 (1941); American Overseas Airlines, Inc., South Atlantic Routes, 7 C.A.B. 285, 304
(1946); United States-Europe-Middle East Cargo Case, 15 C.A.B. 565,
567 (1951); but see North Atlantic Certificate Renewal Case, 15 C.A.B.
1053, 1061 (1951)
(Jones, dissenting), the policy of the Dep't of
Defense is never to testify in behalf of a particular applicant. TransPacific Route Investigation, supra note 63, at 52, 55-56.
121. Pan American Airways, Africa Serv., 3 C.A.B. 32 (1941); American Overseas Airlines, Inc., South Atlantic Routes, 7 C.A.B. 285 (1946);
South Atlantic Route Renewal Case, 19 C.A.B. 276 (1954).
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In the recent United States-South American Route Case we
find the staff recommending that service be continued at
Ascuncion, Paraguay, and Monte Video, Uruguay, for "national interest" reasons. Similar considerations seem to have
prevailed in the staff recommendation for service to Brasilia,
the new capital of Brazil even though no estimate could be
made of the traffic to be served at this point. 122 However,
in general the Board has refused to grant weight to diplomatic considerations in determining public convenience and
necessity. In two areas where the problem has arisen the
C.A.B. has been actually hostile. The first is in providing
service for local traffic in foreign lands. For various reasons, which are mostly financial, 123 the Board has consistently refused to grant local traffic route awards. But the
fact remains that a foreign interest in local air transport
also provides, like other foreign investments, the opportunity
for diplomatic intervention,1 24 a factor which should be investigated by the Board. The mere presence of the Americal
carrier is newsworthy in the new nations of the world. 125
The second area is where the proposed route award would
conflict with existing treaty rights. Under §1102 of the
Act the Board is required to exercise its powers and duties
"consistently with any obligation assumed by the United
States in any treaty, convention, or agreement that may be
in force between the United States and any foreign country
or foreign countries.1' 126 This means that where there is
an existing treaty which defines a particular route in regard
to American carriers and specifies the number of American
carriers which can serve the route, the Board will not authorize a route or select a carrier in contravention to the
treaty.127 There is an exception to this rule which had brief
122. United States-South America Route Investigation, supra note 27.

123. Discussed supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text; infra notes
167-173 and accompanying text.
124. LISSITZYN, at 63, 64 n. 19.
125. North Atlantic Certificate Renewal Case, 15 C.A.B. 1053, 1104,
1108 (1951); Project Horizon 30, 135-45, esp. at 139, credits previous
American and foreign aviation for beneficial effects on South American
nations in the development of their transportation systems and calls
for focussing on the internal aviation needs and possibilities of the
new nations in order to assist them in obtaining national unity - geographic economic, and political.
126. §1102; 49 U.S.C.A. §1502 (1958).
127. Northwest Airlines, Inc., Additional Service to Canada, 2 C.A.B.
627 632 (1940) ; Latin America Case, 8 C.A.B. 65, 72-73 (1947). Neither
will the Board recognize any private negotiations with a foreign
country; since 1943 all negotiations for international air routes have
been conducted by the State Department. THOMAS, ECONoMIc Raou-

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss5/3

26

1963]

Roberts: Criteria for the Award of a Foreign Air Route to a Domestic Air C
CRITERIA AWARD - DOMESTIC AIR CARRIER
893

life immediately after World War II. At that time the Board
was willing to grant routes to carriers even though there was
no treaty in effect between the United States and the country
where the terminal was located. 128 Since that time the C.A.B.
has returned to its strict policy. In one case applications
were denied for cargo service to the Middle East on the
grounds that they would "upset the delicate balance of international civil air relationships."' 129 Interference with diplomatic negotiations may provide an excuse to refuse an application. Twice the Board has refused to grant an award
for additional service to Mexico City because such an award
might endanger negotiations in progress in Mexico to allow
Braniff to implement service under a grant made in the
original Latin American Case. 30 Undoubtedly, the Board in
its wisdom (as usual gained through painful experience)
wishes to avoid duplicating the Mexico City situation which
no doubt has provided opportunities for ex parte diplomatic
intervention on the part of the carrier seeldng the route.
This would certainly be the last thing that the State Department needs in performing its official duties on behalf of
the C.A.B. 131
S. Postal Ser-vice
The needs of the Postal Service must also be considered. 32
From the paucity of cases involving this criterion directly, it
appears that it has rarely had a direct influence on route
awards, except where totally new service is being proposed
as in the early international route cases or in the all-cargo
SCHEDULED Am TRANSPORT, 214 (1951). See Calkins, The Role
of the Civil Aeronautics Board in the Grant of Operating Rights in Foreign Air Carriage, 22 J. Am L. ComM., 253, 263 (1955); Rhyne, Legal
Rules for InternationalAviation, 31 VA.L.Rsv. 267, 269 (1945) (Text of
LATION o

State Department's 1944 Memorandum). The State Department's activities have been criticized as detrimental to the health of U.S. carriers.
See Friendly, at 1305 n. 475; Bluestone, at 6-11.

128. Northeast Airlines, Inc., North Atlantic Route Case, 6 C.A.B., 319,

322 (1945); Pacific Case, 7 C.A.B. 209, 243, 248 (1946) (Gurney, dissenting); North Atlantic Certificate Renewal Case, 15 C.A.B. 1053,
1056-57 (1951); Transatlantic Cargo Case, 21 C.A.B. 671, 684 (1954).
129. United States-Europe-Middle East Air Cargo Case, 15 C.A.B.
565,567 (1951).
130. Chicago & Southern Airlines, Inc. - Pan American World Airways, Inc., Interchange Agreement, 15 C.A.B. 685, 688 (1950); ChicagoMexico City Case, 25 C.A.B. 464, 466 (1957). Failure to implement

service on a route due to circumstances beyond the control of a carrier
will not result in loss of the carrier's operating rights, note 79 supra.
131. See note 127 supra.
132. §§102(a) (d) ; 401 (1) (m); 406(a) (b) ; 49 U.S.C.A. §§1302 (a) (d),
1371(1) (m),1375, 1376(a) (b) (1958). The Postmaster General's power
to order scheduling is very rarely exercised. Bluestone, at 15.
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service cases. Evidence of a large bulk of mail between the
United States and the terminal or intermediate cities on the
route8 3 or evidence of substantial expediting of mail
handling 34 are affirmative factors to consider in determining
public convenience. Similar considerations naturally prevail
to a stronger degree in the all-cargo service cases. 13 5 By
the same reasoning, if no improvement can be made in the
mail service, this too must be considered, 36 as where cargo
capacity on passenger ships is adequate to meet the needs
of cargo service, 3 7 or where the speed of delivery cannot
significantly be increased. 38
C.

1.

FACTUAL CRITERIA

General Considerations

Aside from the clear statutory commands mentioned, supra,
it is obvious that there can be fixed and rigid definition of
public convenience and necessity as applied in practices; the
meaning of the term can only be determined in light of the
factual situation before the Board and the objectives of the
statute as intepreted by the Board. 3 9 This has of necessity
lead to the formulation of elaborate factual doctrines for
determining whether the public interest requires certification
of a particular route. Accordingly, in an early international
route case, the Board enunciated four general criteria:
(1) Whether the new service will serve a useful purpose responsive to a public need;
(2) whether this purpose can and will be served adequately by existing parties and carriers;
133. Pan American Airways (Del.), Transatlantic Operations, 1 C.A.A.
128 (1939); South Atlantic Renewal Case, 19 C.A.B. 276, 285 (1954).
134. Pan American Airways (Nev.), New Zealand Operations, 1 C.A.A.
695, 707 (1939); Pacific Case, 7 C.A.B. 230 (1946).

135. Air Freight Case, 10 C.A.B. 527 (1949); Latin American Air
Freight Case, 16 C.A.B. 430 (1951); Transatlantic Cargo Case, 21 C.AB.
671 (1954).
136. American Overseas Airlines, Inc., South Atlantic Route Case, 7
C.A.B. 235, 305 (1946).
137. Latin American Air Freight Case, supra note 135, at 117, 119

(Ryan and Gurney, dissenting); Transatlantic Cargo Case, supra note
135 at 691-92 (Ryan and Gurney, dissenting). United States-EuropeMiddle East Cargo Case, 15 C.A.B. 565, 587-88, 597 (1951).

138. Pan American World Airways, Inc., Service to American Samoa,

15 C.A.B. 545, 555 (1951).

139. Northwest Airlines, Inc., Duluth-Twin Cities Operations, 1 C.A.A.

573, 591 (1940); THOMAS, ECoNo Ic REGULATION OF SCHEDULED Am
TRANSPORT, 70-71, 73, 225-26 (1951).
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(3) whether it can be served by the applicant without
impairing the operations of existing carriers contrary
to the public interest;
(4) whether the cost of the proposed service to the government will be outweighed by the benefit which will
140
accrue to the public from the new service.
In applying the tests the Board has not actually outlined
them and followed them minutely.' 4 1 However, upon an examination of the major international route awards, it is
clear that the decisions have been premised upon the general
criteria. In determining public need the Board considers the
passenger traffic available for the service, the type of service to be provided, the cost of the proposed service, integration
of the proposed route with existing routes, the effect on
other carriers, and the problems of competition. The most
important factors for the applicants are probably the appeals
to efficiency and economy, the avoidance of conflicts of interest, and fear of monopoly power, which figure prominently
in the decision-making process.
2. Traffic Potential
It is manifest that an award of a certificate of public convenience and necessity will not be responsive to a public need
unless there are passengers who will support the new service.
This requirement is called the "traffic potential" of a route,
and the burden of demonstrating it falls on the carrier applying for the route. The traffic potential is measured in
various ways.' 42 Generally, it is said that there must be a
"community of interest" between the points on the route. 43
Evidence of this is usually commercial intercourse over the
route, such as mail, telephone calls, the business climate of
140. Boston-Maine Airways, Inc., Bangor-Monckton Operations, 2 C.A.B.
327, 319 (U940); Western Air Express, Great Falls-Lethbridge Operations, 2 C.A.B. 425 (1940); Northwest Airlines, Inc., Additional Service
to Canada, 2 C.A.B. 627 (1941); Pan American Airways, Inc., Los
Angeles-Mexico City Operations, 2 C.A.B. 807 (1941).
141. THOMAS, op. cit. supra, note 139, at 226; note Paramount Public
Interest in InternationalNew Route Cases, 15 J. Am L. AND Colmm. 480,
485 (1948).
142. See Richmond, Forecasting Air Passenger Traffic by Multiple
Regression Analysis, 22 J. AiR L. AND CoMM. 434 (1955).
143. Pan American Airways (Nev.), New Zealand Operations, 1 C.A.A.
695, 705-07 (1939); San Juan-Madrid Case, 25 C.A.B. 407 (1957);'
THOMAS, op. cit., supra note 139, at 74, 227.
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the points on the route.14 4 Adequacy of existing transportation facilities is extremely important if there is no direct
service to the United States or if the existing service is
lengthy, circuitous, and inconvenient. 145 International events
may play a part in determining the community of interest.
For example, during World War II routes to South America
were granted on the grounds of "strengthened and increased
and South
. . . economic relations between the United States
14 6
America" due to the "events of recent months.'
Where the new service on the route will divert traffic
from other carriers, the applicant who proposes the new
service must show that this diversion will not be harmful
or that the benefits to the public outweigh the harmful
effects. 147 Other aspects of the problem of traffic potential
which figure more prominently in other areas of public convenience and necessity are the increased capacity due to
new high speed jet equipment, the problem of seasonal traffic
route system, and competition from
in balancing the carrier's
14
foreign air carriers.
The important exception to the general requirements of
traffic potential occurs when the carrier applies to serve a
"gateway" city. These cities are the vast metropolitan terminals where a large amount of traffic from the surrounding
region naturally flows for the purpose of connecting with
the trunk-carriers. 49 Under the decisions of the Board, it
appears that such a terminal is deemed to have a potential
in and of itself. One of the outstanding examples of this
type of exemption from the general requirements occurred
at the Miami gateway. In the Latin American Case Braniff
was awarded a route from Houston to South America. In
order to serve East Coast traffic Braniff was required to
144. Pan American Airways (Del.), Transatlantic Operations, 1 C.A.A.

119, 128 (1938); Pacific Case, 7 C.A.B. 209, 230 (1946); Trans-Pacifie
Route Case, supra note 63.
145. Pan American World Airways, Inc., Service to American Samoa,
15 C.A.B. 545 (1952); Trans-Pacific Route Case, supra note 63, at 11.
146. Caribbean Investigation, 4 C.A.B. 199, 204 (1943); Pan American Airways, Inc., New Orleans-Guatemala City Service, 4 C.A.B. 161,
174 (1943); American Airlines, Inc., Temporary Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity, 3 C.A.B. 415 (1942).
147. Discussed under "Competition" infra.
148. See "Route Planning" infra.
149. Western Air Express, Great Falls-Lethbridge Operations, 2 C.A.B.
425 (1940); Pacific Case, 7 C.A.B. 209, 219, 221 (1946). The burden
is the carrier seeking to change a gateway to show that a "substantial
improvement" in the quality of service will result. Additional Service
to Latin America Case, on recolslderation, 8 C.A.B. 65, 68 (1947).
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provide connecting service at Havana, Cuba, with National. 5 0
Several years after the award, when the carrier was unable
to attract sufficient traffic to support the service, it petitioned the C.A.B. to make its connection in Miami. The
Board granted the request on the ground that Braniff would
be serving a gateway city and need not show that there
was adequate traffic potential or that there would be no
harmful diversion from other carriers serving Miami.5
Whether the force of this criterion remains is in doubt.
Basically, it is a device for the Board to overlook the problems
of diversion from other carriers or to overlook the nettlesome problem of competition.15 2 The strict view that the
Board has taken against duplication in the Transatlantic
Route Renewal and United States-South American Service
cases suggests that the gateway exception is no longer viable,
for the crux of those cases, especially the one involving
European routes, is that duplicating service even to gateways
may be inadvisable in the present era because of the intensive
competition from foreign air carriers.1 3

3.

Cost and Diversion

Intertwined with the problems of traffic potential is the
Board's all-important policy that the cost of the service must
not exceed the benefits to the public as defined by the Policies
of the Board and the Federal Aviation Act.15 4 The "cost"
referred to is payment for the carriage of mail, which all
carriers are under an obligation to carry if the Postmaster
General so directs. 55 Under the terms of the Act, the Board
150. 6 C.A.B. 857, 901, 914 (1947).
151. Braniff Airways, Inc., Exemption, 14 C.A.B. 327 (1951).

Con-

siderations of "route planning" and "competition" had a considerable
force in the various Board decisions involving Braniff's South American
Routes. Id. at 328. See also Latin American Air Service Case, 6 C.A.B.
857 (1946); 8 C.A.B. 65 (1947); Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc.
et al., 9 C.A.B. 325 (1948); Pan American Airways, Inc. - Domestic
Route Case, 10 C.A.B. 852 (1950); New York-Balboa Through Service
Proceedings (Reopened), 18 C.A.B. 493 (1954); 20 C.A.B. 501 (1954);
United States-South America Route Case, supra note 27, at 3, 24.
152. See Friendly, at 1305 n. 475.

153. Supra n. 27; North Atlantic Certificate Renewal Case, 15 C.A.B.
1053, 1098 (1951).
154. Pan American Airways (Nev.), Pan American Airways, Inc., New
Orleans-Guatemala Service, 4 C.A.B. 161, 176 (1943); American Export
Airlines, Inc., Transatlantic Service, 2 (CA.B. 16, 37 (1940) ; New Zealand

Operations, 1 C.A.A. 695, 704 (1939); Northwest Airlines, Inc., DuluthTwin Cities Operation, 1 C.A.A. 573, 578-79; THOMAs, at 95-100.
155. §§401(1)(m), 405; 49 U.S.C.A. §§1371(1)(m); 1375 (1958).
This power is rarely used. Bluestone, at 15.
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is empowered to fix and determine "fair and reasonable rates
of the compensation for the transportation of mail."' 5 6 In
effect, this is a system of subsidization of the carrier's op157
erations where they fail to become commercially profitable.
Thus, the Act provides the following criteria for the Board:
(1) the condition that such air carriers may hold and
operate under certificates authorizing the carriage of
mail only by providing adequate facilities and service
for the transportation of mail;
(2) such standards respecting the character and quality
of service to be rendered by air carriers as may be prescribed by or pursuant to law; and
(3) the need of each such air carrier for compensation
for the transportation of mail sufficient to insure the
performance of suck service, and, together with all other
revenue of the air carrier, to enable such air carrier
under honest, economical, and efficient management, to
maintain and continue the development of air transportation to the extent and of the character required for
the commerce of the United States, the Postal Service,
and the national defense. 15 s
In the early cases the Board took the attitude that cost,
although it was important, was not controlling in determining the ultimate question of public convenience and necessity.01 9 In 1941 Chairman Edward P. Warner stated, "[T]he
balancing of commercial revenue against the cost of operation,
which would supply the measure of success in a purely com156. §406; 49 U.S.C.A. §1376 (1958).
157. FULDA, COMPETITION IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES, at 15;
THOMAS, op. cit. supra note 139, at 95-100, 246; WESTMEYER, ECONOMICS
OF TRANSPORTATION 547 (1952).

158. §406; 49 U.S.C.A. §1376 (1958). The phrase "together with all
other revenue of the air carrier" means that an air carrier must balance
costs of his international routes against his total revenues, domestic and
international, before he is eligible for subsidy. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
v. Summerfield, 347 U.S. 74, 78-79, 98 L.Ed. 513 (1954); American
Overseas Airlines v. C.A.B., 254 F.2d 744, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1958). It
should be noted that no subsidies are presently being paid on international
operations. Bluestone, at 21; Trans-Atlantic Final Mail Rate Case, Dockets 1706, 1706A, 8837, Order E-18018, February 13, 1962 (Mimeograph
copy). See generally, Howell, The Rate of Return in Air Transport, 24
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 677, 678, 681 (1959); Gelman, The

Regulation of Competition in Domestic Air Transportation: A Judicial
Survey and Analysis, 24 J. Am L. & CoMM. 410, 426 (1957); Hale and
Hale, supra note 11, at 339-41.
159. Supra note 154; Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc., 9 C.A.B. 325,
327 (1948).
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mercial sense, now plays only a minor part, if any, in the deCiSionS.''160 Accordingly, in the postwar decisions involving
initial service where it could be shown that the implementing
or extending a route was consistent with the Board's plan
of international routes 161 or that there was a prospect for
62
increasing traffic, the Board would grant the application.
The usual language of the decisions was to the effect that
"cost could not be considered controlling where the national
interest is involved." 163 Thus, when Panagra sought to have
the Board reconsider Braniff's South American service less
than two years after the original authorization, the Board
adamantly refused to recognize that a carrier's subsidy costs
could be grounds for reviewing matters of public convenience
and necessity. 64 However, where the application proposed
service between points which already had air transportation,
the C.A.B. took a strict view, saying that there was no sufficient benefit to the public by merely increasing the frequency of the flights on a route already served by an air
carrier. 65 The Board even refused an offer by a carrier
to serve without subsidy on the ground that a new carrier
on the route would divert revenue from existing air car6
riers and would cause them to seek subsidization.
The factor of cost has also influenced the Board policy
discouraging the service of local traffic. The traditional view
has been that this service will not have adequate traffic
167
potential and will thereby incur unnecessary subsidy costs.
The reason for the low traffic potential seems to lie in the
national loyalty that the local traveler has to his local air
carrier. 6s Moreover, the Board has discouraged participation
160. LIssITzYN, op. cit. supra note 105.
161. See Route Planning, infra.
162. Supra note 154; Pan American Airways, Inc., London-FrankfurtRome Serv. 20 C.A.B. 441, 442, 444 (1955).
163. Supra note 154; North Atlantic Certificate Renewal Case, 15 C.A.B.

1053, 1096 (1951).
164. Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc. et al., Petition, 9 C.A.B. 325,
327 (1948).
165. Northwest Airlines, Inc., Additional Service to Canada, 2 C.A.B.

627, 641 (1940); see discussion of the problems of diversion under
"Competition," infra.

166. Waterman S.S. Corp. and Waterman Airlines, Inc., New OrleansSan Juan Service, 159 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1947); aff'd sub nom. Waterman S.S. Co. v. C.A.B., 333 U.S. 103, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948); see North
Atlantic Certificate Renewal Case, 15 C.A.B. 1053, 1058-59 (1951);
cf. Pan American-Grace Airlines, Inc., 9 C.A.B. 325 (1948).
167. See "conflict of interest" supra.

168. Latin American Air Service, 8 C.A.B. 65, 72-73 (1947); United
States-South America Route Investigation, supra note 27, at 15-16. Be-
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in local traffic because of the uncertainties of the international situation. For example, when Northwest proposed
a stop at Fukuoka, Japan, on its route to Manila, it was
found that adequate support of the route depended on traffic
between Fukuoka and Shanghai. With the success of the
Red Chinese on the China mainland, the carrier could not
serve Shanghai, nor was there any likelihood of its doing so
in the near future. Consequently, the proposed service at
Fukuoka was denied. 16 9 Nevertheless, the Board did take a
different stand when the applicant was able successfully to
demonstrate that his primary purpose in seeking to provide
the local service was to develop long-haul service to points
beyond the immediate locality.' 70 The traffic to be incidentally served is generally termed "support traffic."'17 1
In the same case that denied service to Fukuoka, Northwest
employed this argument to gain an intermediate stop at Okinawa on the Tokyo-Manila route. 17 2 Recently, Eastern was
allowed to extend its trunk route that terminated at Buffalo,
New York, to Toronto, Canada, on the ground that the traffic
served would give it additional "back-up traffic support for
173
its east coast operation."'
The problem of the cost of the service is still present as
a criterion for the award of foreign air routes. In fact, because it is the symptom of the many ills of international air
transport, it is probably the most important single factor
influencing route awards. For example, the cases allowing
local service caution that such service must be "economcause of international treaty restrictions there is virtually no "Fifth

Freedom" traffic or right of cabotage for an air carrier to transport
goods and passengers between foreign states. THOMAS, at 184; see,
Berle, Freedom of the Air, A Blue Print for World Civil Aviation,
DEPT. STATE PUB. 2348, CONF. SEalEs 70 (1945); Rhyne Legal Rules
for International Aviation, 31 VA.L.REv. 267; Ryan, Policy Issues in
International Air Transport, 16 GEo.WASH.L.R.v. 443, 457 (1948).
169. Pacific Route Amendment Case, 12 C.A.B. 158, 178 (1951).

170. Latin American Air Service Case, 6 C.A.B. 857, 904 (1946);
Northwest Airlines, Inc., Additional Service to Canada, 2 C.A.B. 627,
651 (1940); see North Atlantic Route Transfer Case, 11 C.A.B. 676,
680 (1950).
171. Buffalo-Toronto Route Case, supranote 28, at 12.
172. Pacific Route Amendment Case, supranote 169, at 179.
173. Buffalo-Toronto Route Case, supra note 28. (Eastern's application was denied by the Air Transport Board of Canada. Wall Street
Journal, Jan. 14, 1963 p 14 col. 3.) See Service to Montego Bay, 7
C.A.B. 741, 744 (1946), which allowed an additional intermediate stop
on Pan American's Miami-Canal Zone route.
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ical."'7 4 The Board's policies of "strengthening the weak
carrier,"1 75 route balancing, 176 and competition, 7 7 all stress
the necessity of weighing the cost of the service against
the benefits to the public. Departing from the easy optimism
of the early decisions, the Board's present position emphasizes
the necessity of reducing mail pay subsidy. In one of the
early re-appraisals of the South American service the Board
stated: "Basic to the consideration of the questions presented
to us in this proceeding is our determination to take such
action as will further the national policy directed toward
reducing the or (sic) air mail subsidy payments."' 7 8
That cost is paramount is underscored by the issuance
within the past year of staff studies of two of the major
route systems, Europe and South America, plus the overall
report on the national goals for aviation, Project Horizon.
In each the overriding consideration is the necessity of placing United States carriers on a sound financial basis, hence
to reduce the reliance of the carriers on air mail payments. 179
The effect on the criteria for the award of routes is not
mentioned in these reports. But one can glimpse the implications of a policy that stresses reduction of cost. For example, the United States-Soutk America Route Case concludes that Braniff and Delta should be removed from
foreign air transportation because of their continuing heavy
losses. 80 Accordingly, it would seem that the C.A.B. has
abandoned its postwar policy on cost that was so dramatically
etched in the Panagra petition to have Braniff removed from
the South American routes.' 8 ' Today, it would seem to be
an affirmative argument in behalf of a route award for
174. See, e.g., Buffalo-Toronto Route Case, supra note 28; notes 169

supra anid 179 infra and cases cited therein; of. Philadelphia Trans-Atlantic Serv. Case, 15 C.A.B. 148, 149 (1952).

175. Discussed infra.
176. Discussed infra.
177. Discussed infra.

178. New York-Balboa Through Service Proceedings Reopened,
C.A.B. 501, 502 (1954); 20 C.A.B. 493 (1954).

18

179. United States-South American Route Investigation, supra note

27, at 13-19 North Atlantic Route Renewal Case, supra note 27, at 9-12;
Project Horizon, 153. Bluestone, at 20-24, calls for scheduled elimination
of subsidy.

Unit costs have consistently been lower in foreign air

transport, id. at 163, but financial returns remained unsatisfactory until
quite recently. In 1962 TWA reported a substantial profit on international operations with an inversely larger deficit on domestic operations.
Wall Street Journal, Oct. 8, 1962, p. 2, col. 3. No subsidies are presently
paid in international operations. Bluestone, at 21.
180. Supra note 27.
181. Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc. et aL, 9 C.A.B. 325 (1948).
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a carrier to show that absorption of a rival's route would
improve substantially the financial instability of the respec18 2
tive carriers.
4. Direct Service
Because connections in international air travel are more
difficult and critical to make than in domestic travel with
its multitude of flights and intense competition, it is undoubtedly desirable that a passenger have to make a minimum
of connections. The policies of the C.A.B. in international
air transport have largely reflected the realities of this situation. Accordingly, the Board has favored the application
that will provide direct service, i.e., single-plane service,
single-carrier service, or interchange service to the terminus
of the route over which the applicant proposes to provide air
transportation.8 3 Similar considerations have led the Board
to approve "linear route consolidations" by a carrier already
in the field, which, as the term indicates, is a method of arranging a carrier's intermediate stops into a line so that the
carrier can provide nonstop service between any two points
without having to apply for a new route award between those
points.s 4 Again, when two carriers desire to combine by
means of an "interchange agreement' 5 5 to provide direct
service over the same route using the same equipment, as
far as public convenience and necessity are concerned, the
182. See North Atlantic Route Renewal Case, supra note 27, at 14;
North Ati. Certificate Renewal Case, 15 C.A.B. 1053, 1102-05 (1951)
(TWA would lose its routes east of Cairo, Egypt).
183. Pan American Airways, Inc., Singapore Operations, 2 C.AX.
661, 663 (1940); Latin American Air Service Case, 6 C.A.B. 857, 881,
883, 898, 904 (1946) ; Pacific Case, 7 C.A.B. 209, 230 (1946) ; Pan American World Airways, Inc., Gautemala City-Los Angeles Operations, 14
C.A.B. 18, 33 (1950); North Ati. Certificate Renewal Case, supraanote
174, at 1057; Pan American World Airways, Inc., Service to Damascus,
Syria, 19 C.A.B. 697 (1954); Chicago and Southern Airlines, Inc., Service to Maracaibo, 19 C.A.B. 710, 728 (1954); Pan American World
Airways, Inc., Central American-New York-Ciudad Trujillo Nonstop
Serv., 21 C.A.B. 431 (1955); San Juan-Madrid Case, 25 C.A.B. 407,
412 (1957); but see Florida-Mexico City Service Case, supra note 30,
at 2, San Juan Madrid Case, supra, distinguished. See FULA, op. cit.
supra, §7.8.
184. N orth Atlantic Route Transfer Case, 11 C.A.B. 676, 680 (1950);
Pan American Airways, Inc. et al., Latin American Route Amendment
Case, 10 C.A.B. 351 (1949).
185. Such a contract requires C.A.B. approval under the anti-trust
sections of the Act, discussed supra notes 39, 40 and accompanying text.
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Board seems to treat the application on the same basis as
an application to provide direct service.18 6
5.

Substantial Improvement

Although the C.A.B. favors direct service, it is important
to note that an application to provide such service does not
raise any presumption that public convenience and necessity
have been met. The burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that his service will effect a "substantial improvement"
in the flow of traffic. 8 7 For example, in the Latin American Air Service Case the Board indicated that the test
would be met if the carrier could show that he could provide
direct service for passengers beyond the United States terminal of the route under consideration. 88 In that case Pan
American was awarded a route from New York to San Juan
that would allow it to provide direct service as far south as
Buenos Aires. In 1956 when Eastern applied for the New
York-Nassau route, it argued that it would provide better
service for the entire northeast area outside of New York.
The application was rejected when Eastern failed to show
that through service would result. 8 9 Another instance of the
failure to demonstrate substantial improvement occurred in
the New York-Mexico City Case. 90 Pan American applied
to the Board for permission to fly directly from Europe to
186. E.g., Pan American-Panagra Agreement 8 C.A.B. 50 (1947);
Latin American Air Service Case, 8 C.A.B. 65, 68 (1947). For an
analysis of the interchange as a device to avoid the problems of competition, see FULDA, op. cit. supra §7.8, citing Southern Service to the
West Coast Case, 15 C.A.B. 94, 97 (1952); 12 C.A.B. 518, 548-49 (1951)
(Lee, dissenting); Winkelhake, Interchange Service Among the Airlines
of the United States, 22 J. Am L. & Commi. 1 (1955). The problems of
conflicts of interest and harmful diversion combined with gordian
complexity in the C.A.B.'s valiant attempts to provide Panagra with
access to United States mainland traffic without harming National,
Eastern, and Braniff. See Latin American Air Serv. Case, 6 C.A.B.
857 (1946); 8 C.A.B. 65 (1947); New York-Balboa Through Serv.
Proceedings Reopened, 18 C.A.B. 501 (1954); 20 C.A.B. 493 (1954);
United States-South American Route Investigation, supra note 27. The
advent of long range jets have made the interchange useless in international air commerce, because foreign competitors can fly direct,
whereas interchange service requires at least one stop at the junction point
of the carrier's systems. Such a requirement was of no concern when
propeller driven aircraft were being used since all carriers had to
make a similar stop to refuel. Id. at 18.
187. Latin American Air Service, supra note 178 at 897-98; Pan American Airways, Inc., Domestic Route Case, 10 C.A.B. 852, 843, 860, 924-26
(1950).
188. Latin American Air Serv. Case, supra note 186, at 898, 903.
189. New York-Nassau Case, 24 C.A.B. 245, 247 (1954).
190. 25 C.A.B. 323 (1955).
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Mexico City with an intermediate stop at New York City.
The Board denied the Pan American application on the
ground that no substantial improvement over connecting service had been shown in that (1) most passengers preferred
to stop over in New York and (2) Pan American did not
serve the areas in Europe that would attract the traffic. 191
The latter observation again emphasizes the importance of
traffic potential and cost, for the Board in this context has
ruled that the test of substantial improvements has not been
met where the traffic potential is so insubstantial as to impose the burden of mail payments on the government or to
divert and to dilute the traffic of other carriers so as to
impair their earnings and cause them to seek government
subsidy.192 The bias against local service also applies, but
it has been rebutted where the carrier was able to show
the necessity of providing local service in order to improve
the flow of long-haul traffic over the route.1 93
Inasmuch as the criterion of substantial improvement is
essentially an appeal to economy, a logical question is whether
a saving of mileage through the institution of direct service
meets the test. Language in the early decisions would seem
to indicate that it would. The Board at this time spoke of
the desirability of operations over the "shortest feasible
route," and of the "very substantial savings in mileage" of
the shorter routes. 9 3 In the North Atlantic Route Amendment Case0 4 the Board rested an award of an intermediate
stop at Naples on the London-Turkey route of Pan American
on this ground.1 95 It must be emphasized, however, that these
awards were made in the idyllic state of aeronautic nature
that prevailed between 1940 and 1947 when there rarely
loomed the present-day problem of diversion from other car191. Ibid. 332; Additional Service to Latin America, on reconsideration,
8 C.A.B. 65, 68, 70 (1947); Pan American Airways, Inc., Domestic
Route Case, 10 C.A.B. 852, 853-54, 867-68, 870-73, 882 (1950). Compare
Caribbean Investigation, 4 C.A.B. 199, 205, 210 (1943). But see TWA,
Inc., India-Bangkok-Manila Extension, 24 C.A.B. 287, 290 (1956) (Gurney,
dissenting on grounds that connecting service is adequate).
192. Chicago and Southern Airlines, Inc. -Pan American Airways, Inc.,
Interchange Agreement, 15 C.A.B. 685 (1952); New York-Balboa Through
Service Proceedings Reopened, 18 C.A.B. 501, 504 (1954); 20 C.A.B.
493 (1954).
193. Pan American Airways, Inc., New Orleans-Guatemala Service;
Caribbean Area Case, 9 C.A.B. 534, 541 (1948).
194. North Atlantic Route Amendment Case, 7 C.A.B. 133, 138 (1947);
see Pan American Airways, Inc. et aL, Latin American Route Amendment,
10 C.A.B. 351 (1949).
195. 7 C.A.B. 133, 138 (1947).
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riers and competition. Where diversion from other carriers
is involved, the Board has adhered to a more rigid attitude
of substantial improvement. The basic policy on mileage
saving was set in a domestic case in 1945, when the Board
formally declared that a mere saving of mileage would not
be sufficient to meet the test. 19 6 In the international cases of
97
the same year the same concept was applied.
Although language in a subsequent case added some confusion by stating that the test for new service was a "substantial saving in time and mileage,"' 19 the policy today
is that mileage saving is an incidental factor to be considered.
Those cases which do recite the saving of mileage as entering
into the decision are generally decided on a more compelling
ground - that an improvement in the flow of traffic has
been achieved. For example, when Pan American applied
for a route between San Juan and Curacao, it claimed that a
saving of 317 miles would result. The C.A.B. made the award
on the ground that the route would constitute substantial
improvement in Pan American's service by integrating with
the New York-Caracas route.19 9 Clearly demonstrating the
incidental nature of mileage saving is the Boston-Bermuda
Case.200 Pan American was awarded the route, which in fact
eliminated a 184-mile penalty that Boston passengers incurred by having to make connections in New York City.
The basis of the decision, however, was not that primarily
of saving mileage, but was the fact that Pan American would
be better able to handle the seasonal swings of traffic than
its rival Colonial. 20 ' In other words, had Pan American not
applied and had the Board found Colonial unfit to fly the
route, the Board would have had little justification for finding that the route was needed for the public convenience
and necessity.
196. West Coast Case, 6 C.A.B. 961, 977 (1946).
197. Additional Service to Latin America, 6 C.A.B. 857, 897 (1946);

Service to Toronto, 12 C.A.B. 305, 325 (1952); accord Pan American
Airways, Inc. et al., Latin American Route Amendments, 10 C.A.B.

351, 359-60 (1949).
198. Additional Service to Latin America, on 'recoaideratwn,8 C.A.B.
65,72 (1947).
199. Caribbean Area Case, 9 C.A.B. 534, 543 (1948).
200. 9 C.AB. 534 (1948).
201. Id., at 565.
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1.

ROUTE PLANNING

Statutory Provisions

Of all the factors of public convenience and necessity, none
should be more important than that of long-range planning
to maintain the steady growth necessary to a soundly functioning system of public transportation. 20 2 Such was undoubtedly the intention of Congress in passing the Federal
Aviation Act. In the criteria of public convenience and necessity set forth in §102 of the act, Congress speaks of "the encouragement and development of an air transportation system," and of "competition of the extent necessary to assure
'20
the sound development of an air-transportation system
which will meet the needs of the United States. The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Authority is "empowered
and directed ... to foster the development of civil aeronautics."2 0 4 Finally, the Administrator "is directed to make long
range plans for and formulate policy with respect to orderly
development and use of navigable airspace. ' 20 5 And if the
statute had been silent on the subject, common sense would
still have dictated that from time to time the C.A.B. should
set out its policies and make surveys and re-appraisals of
past decisions in order to discourage the ragged, unbalanced
and uneconomical routings that a system of ad hoe a Wards
brings with it. But common sense has not always resided
with federal regulatory agencies, and the C.A.B., especially
in the domestic field, has most missed its company. In the
international area the Board has been frequently negligent
in regard to planning, but its record is substantially better
than its domestic one. 20 6
2.

Ajudicatory Methods

By its nature, route planning is essentially a device to prevent destructive competition among American air carriers
20 7
in foreign air commerce.
Beginning with President Roosevelt's admonition to the
Board early in World War II to undertake studies of "such
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Bluestone, at 49.
§102; 49 U.S.C.A. §1302 (1958).
§305; 49 U.S.C.A. §1346 (1958).
§307 49 U.S.C.A. §1348 (1958).
Landis, at 18-19, 22-23, 41-42; Hector, at 935; Friendly, at 1091.
Friendly, at 1305 n. 475.
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an integrated air-system as will serve the development of
air transportation for our neighbors and ourselves," 208 the
Board has from time to time undertaken to study the route
systems which are demanded by the needs of the United
States. Its first report was made in 1944 in the form of a
press release which set forth the proposed routes for United
States air carriers in foreign air transportation 0 9 This report espoused a "zonal" basis of routing and largely avoided
direct point-to-point competition between carriers.2 10 Basically, it provided for three routes to Europe, northern, central, and southern or Mediterranean; two around-the-world
routes; and three Pacific routes, northern via Japan and central via Hawaii, and a southern to Australia and New Zealand. The only places where competitive service was to be authorized between the United States and a foreign terminal
were London and Lisbon, which, as the major European
"gateways," were recognized as exceptions. 21 1 The importance
of route planning can only be underscored by the Board's
subsequent failure to continue its appraisal, when one realizes
that for over seventeen years this study was the foundation of
all route award decisions in international aviation. Yet in
that period basic equipment used on international flights
changed twice, and countless new foreign air carriers entered
the field before the Board initiated a new survey. It cannot
be said that new staff reports on the routes of the North
Atlantic and of the South American systems have come too
soon.
3. Route Integration
From this system of route planning, two effects on the
criteria of foreign air routes can be observed: (1) That
208. Colonial Airlines et al., Atlantic Seaboard Case, 4 C.A.B. 392
(1944), cited in Additional Service to Latin America, 6 C.A.B. 857,
860-61 (1946).
209. See THOMAS, op. cit. supra note 139, at 233; Sweeney, Postwar
International Route Planning by the Civil Aeronautics Board, 16 J.
AIR L. & CoMM. 388 (1949); Tipton and Gerwitz, The Effect of Regulated Competition on the Air Transport Industry, 22 J. Ama L. & COMm.
157 (1955).
210. Friendly, at 1305 n. 475; cf. Lissiz N, at 262; note, Paramount
Public Interest In International New Route Cases, 15 J. Am L. &
COMM. 480 (1948); see North Atlantic Route Case, 7 C.A.B. 455, 456
(1947).
211. THOMAS, op. cit. supra, at 235-37; Sweeney, supra note 209;
North East Airlines, North Atlantic Route Case, 6 C.A.B. 319 (1945);
Additional Service to Latin America, 6 C.A.B. 857 (1946); Pacific
Case, 7 C.A.B. 209, 223 (1947). See Pan American Airways, TransAtlantic Operations, 1 C.A.B. 118, 131 (1939).
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the growth of the national system demands implementation
of these routes; and (2) that the carrier whose existing system will most readily accommodate the new route should be
preferred. Thus, the former is directly concerned with publie convenience and necessity; the latter is concerned with
the choice of carrier after the route has been deemed necessary. But the traditional caveat as to the clear distinction
between the two still applies.
In application, the doctrine of route planning can hardly
be said to be a sharp departure from the policies discussed
supra. Many of its features are simple extensions of the
basic doctrines, for in essence it is largely a combination of
"direct service" and the appeal to economy, "cost.1212 For
example, the force of route planning is evident in the Board's
policies on the award of local service routes to the long distance carriers. In granting local routes only to companies
who specialize in local service, the Board declares that its
policy is the avoidance of conflicts of interest which will
impair service to the public. 213 What it is actually doing is
tailoring the carriers to the type of routes it wants them to
serve - "route planning." And what it is really saying is
that trunk carriers will not be able to function in an economic manner if they attempt to provide two wholly different kinds of services.
A.

OPTImIsm

Factors other than rationale extensions of basic doctrines
also have played a prominent part in the Board's policies.
The most important of these, "optimism," is derived from the
Board's expert knowledge of the potential of the industry.214
Its Panglossean nature was apparent from the first when
the Board proclaimed in the 1946 North Atlantic Route Case:
We may confidently look forward to the sound development of a sharply expanded transportation system even
though precise predictions as to the volume of traffic cannot be made .... we do not believe that we should take
an ultra-conservative or overcautious course in dealing
with the future of this industry...215
212. Westwood, at 73, 76.
213. See notes 32-38, supra, and accompanying text.

214. Westwood, at 172.
215. 6 CA.B. 319, 322 (1945).
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The reason for this optimism was evident: from the early
days of transatlantic service no other carriers except United
States carriers were operating or capable of operating in
international air transport. It logically followed that American carriers should "seize the day." 216
The force and the danger of the policy can be seen in the
development of the Pacific routes, for, as Westwood has put
it, "The seeds of an optimism that was later to become
almost hysterical had been planted. ' 21 6 a Of primary importance in these proceedings was the fact that the Board
decided that there should be two American around-the-world
air services. The stage had been set in the North-Atlantic
Route Case which authorized Pan American and TWA to
serve India. 217 In the companion Pacific Case the Board was
faced with the problem of completing its proposed round-theworld service. 218 Pan American's old central Pacific route
from the west coast was extended to Hong Kong and Calcutta,
thereby providing single-carrier round-the-world service. Pan
American was also granted routes to Australia and Batavia,
but the gap between the two points was not closed by authorization of service. A second round-the-world service was made
possible through the certification of Northwest over the
northern Pacific great circle route from Chicago and Seattle
to Manila and with the extension of TWA to Shanghai, where
the routes of the two carriers would intersect. Although it
would appear that the Board had authorized a comprehensive
pattern of service throughout Asia, strong objections to the
Board's actions came from the dissenting opinion of Member
Lee. He protested the failure of the Board to authorize a
complete system of American air carriage in Asia. His specific objections were that the Board had failed to link Pan
American's Australia-Batavia service points and that it was
necessary to provide a second carrier over the northern Pacific route who would primarily serve the east coast of the
United States. In a strongly worded opinion, he revealed
the carpe diem philosophy that had motivated his dissent:
The Board cannot readily correct an error made now
of providing an inadequate system of air transportation
216. American Export Airlines, Trans-Atlantic Operations, 2 C.A.E.

16,33 (1940).
216a. Westwood, at 172.

217. 6 CA.B. 319 (1945).
218. 7 C.A.B. 227 (1946).
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in the Pacific area. Unless an adequate route pattern
is created in this proceeding, we may lose forever the
opportunity now afforded us to establish a comprehensive American Service to the Orient. There are occasions
when it is an expensive luxury to indulge in overaution . . . the determination of an international route
pattern, unlike the determination of the domestic route
pattern, is subject to change by many agencies other
than this Board. We cannot expect in a subsequent review of the present issues to find the pattern of international services in the Orient exactly as we leave it in
this proceeding. The open field opportunities which
American-flag carriers have today for making a success
of newly certificated routes will not last long and are
not likely to return. Therefore it is a mistake to certificate only a minimum of service now in the belief that
we shall have a second chance at this field under equally
favorable conditions. Instead of following a timid "wait
and see" policy, I believe we should pursue a farsighted,
progressive policy which will maintain our strong position of leadership in air transportation. 219
Although Member Lee was disappointed at the Board's "wait
and see" policy, it would seem in retrospect that even this
"timid" program may have been rash in its expectations.
It may even be suggested that current problems of unprofitable routings could only be worse with additional routes
which even today have limited traffic potential for American air carriers.
The force of optimistic route planning has been strong in
the subsequent Pacific Route cases. At times it has been used
to avoid the traditional concepts of traffic potential. In the
Pacific Route Amendment Case 220 in 1951, Pan American
was authorized to conduct an all-cargo operation over the
Australia-New Zealand trunk route via Noumea. Although
passenger and cargo traffic was admittedly insufficient to
support the route at that time, the Board awarded the route
on the ground it was desirable to have a United States carrier in a position to serve the traffic as soon as it showed
219. Id. at 244. See also id. at 248-49, 251; notes and text at notes

246-247 infra.

220. 12 C.A.B. 158 (1951).
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signs of increasing.2 21 Later cases have almost entirely involved implementation of the original Pacific routes, especially completion of TWA's round-the-world routes. These
decisions are notable for their swings of opinion over the importance of traffic potential. In 1955 TWA applied for an
extension from Colombo, Ceylon, to Tokyo via Hong Kong so
that it could connect with Northwest, which had applied for
an extension from Tokyo to Hong Kong and Tapei. 222 The
Board granted the Northwest application on the ground of
improving existing service by providing direct service for
Northwest passengers and thereby avoiding a connection
with foreign carriers.22 3 TWA was turned down because the
Board felt that point-to-point duplication (between Hong
Kong and Tokyo) would be unwise with the limited traffic
potential.2 24 However, the following year TWA and Northwest routes were both extended to meet in Manila to provide
for connecting round-the-world service. 225 The ostensible
ground for the decision was that of implementing the route
pattern of the Pacific Case, supra.22s A close analysis, however, demonstrates that this was but one reason. Other
grounds included a belief that traffic would increase because
of renewed political interest in the East 227 and a desire to
"strengthen" TWA's routes which suffered from the double
disability of having a dead end at Colombo, a gateway generating little traffic, 228 and of having to deliver 81% of its
traffic to foreign earriers. 22 9 The next route case involved
an even greater swing away from adherence to traffic potential considerations. 28 0 In 1959 President Eisenhower
ordered a revision of the Pacific routes to provide the fullest
competition. This time the Board provided full implementation for the "Pacific Pattern" by granting Northwest a
cntral Pacific route to Tokyo via Hawaii in competition
with Pan American; and to Pan American it allocated a
northern Pacific route to Tokyo via Seattle in competition
221. Id. at 172.
222. Trans-Pacific Certificate Renewal Case, 20 C.A.B. 47 (1955).
223. Id. at 62.
224. Id. at 66; see opinion of Lee and Adams, dissenting, ibid. at
74, 76.
. 225. Trans World Airlines, Inc., India-Bangkok-Manila Extension, 24
C.A.B. 287 (1956).
226. Id. at 288, citing Pacific Case, 7 C.A.B. 209 (1946).
.227. Id. at 302.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 299; see opinion of Gurney, dissenting, id. at 290.
230. Trans-Pacific Route Case, supra note 63.
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with Northwest. TWA was extended to Hong Kong to connect with Northwest. The TWA application for a Hong
Kong-Tokyo route was again denied. 2 1 Even though the
President found it necessary to deny the new route. awards
to Japan on the grounds of foreign policy, the Board, nevertheless, did grant the TWA extension to Hong Kong, preserving the second around-the-world service. 2 32 The controversy has continued to the present. In 1962 a staff investigation recommended the abolition of the second service. Thus,
the stage is again set for a controversy over the desirability
and implementation of this set of routes first conceived in
1944.233

Although the Board's original route planning may be said,
as with the common law causes of action, "to rule us from
the grave," the Board was careful to leave the door open for
future modification of the routes. The Board declared:
Actual experience with the route pattern we have authorized may well disclose traffic potentialities outside
that pattern for which adjustments should be made. This
Board naturally will seek to evaluate data of this nature
public interest, in the light of
and direct changes that the234
new evidence, may dictate.
Subsequently, the Board has seen fit to merge the original
three zones of competition in Europe into two by approving
23 5
the sale of American Overseas Airlines to Pan American.
As a result of this modification, TWA's service to Rome on
the Southern European Route was found inadequate, and
the Board deemed it necessary to extend the Northern European Route of TWA from Frankfurt to Rome. 230

Current

C.A.B. staff recommendations would again revise the European routes so that the original concept of gateway coapetition would prevail with each United States international air
23 7
carrier serving separate "area" gateways,
231. Id. at 9-11.
232. Id. at 44-51.
233. Trans-Atlantic Route Renewal Case, supa note 27.
234. North Atlantic Route Amendments, 7 C.A.B. 133, 140 (1946);
Pacific Route Amendments, 12 C.A.B. 158, 168 (1951).
235. North Atlantic Route Transfer Case, 11 C.A.B. 676, 678 (1950).
N.B. The President substantially interfered with Board policy in this
case by overruling the Board's decision to sell the assets of American
Overseas Airlines (formerly American Export Airlines) to Pan American.
236. Trans World Airlines, Inc., Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
London/Frankfurt-Rome Service, 20 C.A.B. 441 (1955).
237. Cf. United States-South American Route Investigation, suipra
note 27; Trans-Atlantic Route Renewal Case, supra note 27.
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SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT

With the foregoing general policies of the C.A.B. in mind,
it is evident that a carrier can make a strong argument for
an award of a foreign air route by showing that the route
proposed by the Board, as in the area of public convenience
and necessity, will integrate with the carrier's existing system. That this is essentially an appeal to economy is indicated by such language in the decisions as "the proposed
operation could be integrated . . .with comparatively little
additional expense." 238 And as a consequence of this underlying consideration the C.A.B. has felt compelled to limit the
implications of the doctrine of route planning and route integration by frequently declaring that long term considerations
must prevail and that the carrier which can contribute the
2 39
most in the short run might not be best in the long run.

Examples of route integration abound in the decisions of
the C.A.B. One of the earliest cases arose in 1949240 as a
result of the route pattern set forth in the original Latin
American Air Service Case.2 41 This case had decided that
public convenience and necessity required a route between
New York and South America. Pan American was chosen
to provide service from New York to San Juan on the ground
that this route itself integrated "most logically" into the Pan
American System and would enable Pan American "to provide single-company service for the heavy traffic moving
between New York and Rio de Janeiro and points as far
south as Buenos Aires. 242 Service to Caracas was provided
by means of a route from San Juan to Ciudad Trujillo and
by interchange and connecting service at Miami.243 In the
Caribbean Area Case,244 Pan American sought an extension
238. E.g., Pan American Airways, Inc., Service from New Orleans

to Cuba and Central America, 4

C.A.B. 161, 177 (1943); of. New

York-Nassau Case, 24 C.A.B. 245, 264 (1956).
239. States-Alaska Case, 20 C.A.B. 791, 841 (1954); North Atlantic
Route, on reconsideration,7 C.A.B. 183, 141 (1947); Additional Service

to Latin America, 6 C.A.B. 857, 899 (1946). Compare New York-Nassau
Case, 24 C.A.B. 245, 265 (1956); Buffalo-Toronto Route Case, supra
note 28, at 5, which urge that operations must be "economical." See
note 159 and accompanying text, supra, for discussion of the statement
that "cost is not controlling."
240. Caribbean Area Case, 9 C.A.B. 534 (1948).
241. Additional Service to Latin America, 6 C.A.B. 857 (1946).
242. Id. at 904.
243. Pan American-Panagra Agreement, 8 C.A.B. 50 (1947); Additional Service to Latin America, on reconsideration, 8 C.A.B. 65 (1947).

244. 9 C.A.B. 534 (1948).
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of its San Juan Route to Curacao and on to Caracas. Noting
that the present Pan American routing via Ciudad Trujillo
was circuitous and not conducive to the development of the
route, the C.A.B. awarded a San Juan Curacao-Carcaeas
route to Pan American on the grounds that the new route
would integrate with Pan American's New York-Caracas
system and that the more direct routing would provide a
"substantial improvement" in service. 245
C.

BALANCE

As the Board has used route planning as a criterion for
"rounding out" the national system of air routes, so has
it considered the "balancing" of the systems of individual
24 6
carriers in making awards to carriers. In the Pacific Case
the C.A.B. was faced with a choice of carrier for routes between the Midwest, the Pacific Northwest, and the Orient.
The applicants were Pennsylvania Central Airlines (later
called Capital), TWA, and Northwest. In selecting Northwest, the Board was impressed by the fact that the carrier
had fully equipped facilities at Minneapolis-St. Paul and
Seattle and was operating between Chicago, the most important junction in the Midwest, the Twin Cities, and Seattle.
The Board concluded:
Northwest's operations between the United States terminals for the route to the Orient would facilitate the
handling of traffic and promote an efficient utilization
of equipment. It is apparent that the northern route to
the Orient can be best integrated in the Northwest
247
system.
The policy of favoring the carrier whose system will be
"balanced" by a route award has continued. Of especial
importance has been the problem of seasonal swings in traffic. This situation occurs where a carrier has to provide
a large number of flights during one part of the year when
traffic is heavy, e.g., resort traffic which is heavier in the
winter months. The consequence of such a seasonal traffic
pattern is that the carrier must acquire extra equipment to
serve the traffic. This in turn results in inefficient utilization
of equipment and personnel, which runs up the cost of the
carrier's operations. Thus, in making a route award, the
245. Id. at 542, 543.
246. 7 C.A.B. 209 (1946). Note the introduction of the problems of
"fitness" into the determination of public convenience and necessity.
247. Id. at 227.
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C.A.B. will prefer the carrier whose route system will be
balanced with a seasonal traffic problem through more ef.
ficient use of personnel and equipment. For example, in the
Boston-BermudaCase248 Pan American was chosen in preference to Colonial. Because Pan American had an excess capacity in the winter months due to reduced traffic on its
European routes, it was better able to handle the seasonal
24 9
surge of winter vacation traffic to Bermuda.
It should not be supposed, however, that the doctrine of
route integration operates in a vacuum, divorced from a
consideration of benefits to the public. Increased utilization
of equipment is not in itself of sufficient force to require the
grant of a route or the selection of a carrier. The Board
has on occasion rejected an applicant where the applicant
would not be benefited.2 50 Moreover, the Board has indicated that the public should be benefited through a "substantial improvement" in service.2 51 Accordingly, the Board
has spoken of improving the flow of traffic as an important
consideration in making a route award.25 2 This has been
particularly prominent in the cases involving the elimination
of dead-end terminals. TWA received an extension of its,
European routes from London-Frankfurt to Rome so that
it could offer an improved flow of traffic between the United
States and points in Europe. 253 Similar considerations ruled
the C.A.B.'s extension of TWA from Colombo to Hong Kong
and Manila 254 and of its award of a Sydney-Djokjakarta
route to Pan American for the purpose of "closing the gap"
25 5
in its South Pacific System.
248. 9 C.A.B. 563 (1948).
249. Id. at 565; New York-Nassau Case, 24 C.A.B. 245, 265 (1956);.
cf. West Coast & Hawaii Case, 20 C.A.B. 9, 12 (1955).
250. Service to Toronto, 12 C.A.B. 305, 325 (1952); but cf. Colonial
Airlines, Inc., Washington-Ottawa-Montreal Service, 6 C.A.B. 481, 501
(1945).
251. Caribbean Area Case, 9 C.A.B. 534, 542, 543 (1948); but of.
Service to Puerto Rico Case, 26 C.A.B. 72 (1957), (Gurney dissenting
at 80.) See notes 375-382 infra and text.
252. Northwest Airlines, Additional Service to Canada, 2 C.A.B. 627,
651 (1940); Western Air Express, Great Falls-Lethbridge Operations,
2 C.A.B. 425 (1940); Caribbean Area Case, 9 C.A.B. 534 pasqfn (1948);
Trans World Airlines, 20 C.A.B. 441, 442 (1955).
253. Pan American Airways, Inc., London-Frankfurt-Rome Service,
20 C.A.B. 441 (1955).
254. Trans World Airlines, Inc., India-Bangkok-Manila Extension,
24 C.A.B. 287, 288 (1956).
255. Trans-Pacific Certificate Renewal Case, 20 C.A.B. 47, 62 (1955);
Trans-Pacific Route Case, supra note 63, at 11, 37; San Juan-Madrid
Case, 25 C.A.B. 407, 410 (1957).
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Charter of Limitations -

Substantia Improvement
As much as the Board's route pattern has been a blue
print for growth and extension of American air carrier
service, so has the pattern acted as a charter of limitations.
Where no compelling benefit to the public interest is shown,
the Board will refuse an application that departs from and
disrupts the basic route pattern.25 6 For example, Pan American was denied the right to serve Shanghai on its TokyoCalcutta route because, the Board held, such an award would
inject Pan American into competition with Northwest in
the Northern Pacific Area, a situation not contemplated by
the original route pattern. 57 Similar reasoning was found
in the C.A.B.'s denial of an interchange between St. Louis,
Houston, and Mexico City.2 53 Interestingly enough, in the
latter case, the Board then proceeded to authorize a route
from St. Louis to Houston which would allow connecting
service to Mexico City. Any competitive diversion from this
type of service, the Board reasoned, would only be "incidental. "25-10 Whether connecting service as opposed to single
plane interchange service would in fact be less desirable was
not inquired into. Yet, in many cases, prior and subsequent
to the pending case, the Board had found that single plane
service offered no improvement over connecting service where
the junction point was a major gateway.2 6 0 Inasmuch as
Houston was considered a gateway both in this case and in
the earlier Latin American proceedings, 251 it would seem
that the C.A.B. was displaying manifestly contradictory
attitudes.
E.

STRENGTHENING THE WEAK CARRIER

Given the Board's policies of "Balancing" a carrier's route
system and that of reducing subsidy cost 2612 - both of which
256. Cf. North Atlantic Route Amendments, 7 C.A.B. 455, 456 (1945);
Northwest Airlines, Inc., Additional Service to Canada, 2 C.A.B. 627,
633 (1940).
257. Trans-Pacific Certificate Renewal Case, 20 C.A.B. 47, 54-55
(1955); North Atlantic Route Amendments, 7 C.A.B. 455, 456 (1955);
but see West Coast Hawaii Case, 20 C.A.B. 7 (1955).
268. Chicago & Southern Airlines, Inc. - Pan American Airways, Inc.,
Interchange Agreement, 15 C.A.B. 685 (1952).
259. Id. at 687.
260. See notes 187-191 supra and accompanying text.
261. E.g., Additional Service to Latin America Case, 6 C.A.B. 857
(1946); New York-Balboa Through Service Proceedings Reopened, 20
C.A.B. 501 (1954); 20 C.A.B. 493 (1954).
262. See notes 174-180, 246-251, supra and accompanying text.
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are directed toward the development of an economical and
efficient system of air transportation, the important questions arise: (1) To what extent will the C.A.B. implement
these policies? (2) Must the Board take affirmative action
to "strengthen" a "weak" carrier? The answer was given
in a series of domestic cases involving local service, which
were decided during World War I. If the local carrier was
to survive, the Board reasoned, it must be protected from
destructive competition which would result from authorizing
trunk carriers to provide local service. Moreover, the Board
was cognizant of the problems of a conflict of interest that
might lead to a deterioration of local service should the
trunk carriers come to dominate local service.2 63 In the
process of arriving at this conclusion the Board began to
speak of awarding the routes according to the relative need
of the local carrier.2 64 As the controversy over the dominance of the industry by the "big-four"2 65 raged, the decisions of the Board wre cast in terms of "strengthening" the
local carrier by providing it with additional traffic centers
266
of importance.
The implications of such a policy were far-reaching. Soon
three issues emerged which were critical to the success or
failure of the applicants for the route award. These were:
(1) Must there be a public need for the route in question?
(2) Is the proper criterion the need of the carrier?
(3) Must the carrier be actually strengthened?
Resolution of the conflict between the first two issues
depends upon whether the doctrine of "strengthening the
weak carrier" is concerned with the selection of the carrier
in the way that fitness, willingness, and ability are, or with
the grant of a route in the public interest in the way that
traffic potential and direct service are. If the doctrine ap263. See notes 35-38 supra.
264. E.g., Western Airlines, Inc., Denver-Los Angeles Service, 6 C.A.B.
199, 211 (1944); Alaska Air Lines, Inc., Service to Anchorage, Alaska,
3 C.A.B. 522, 528 (1942); Westwood, supra n. 8, at 80-103, exp. at
80-81.
265. Westwood at 81-82.

See Southeast-Northeast

Service Case, 22

C.A.B. 52, 56-57 (1955).

266. Continental Airlines, Inc., Denver-Kansas City Case, 4 C.A.B. 1,

18 (1943); Trans-Continental and Western Airlines, Inc., North-South

California Service, 4 C.A.B. 254, 297, 313 (1943); Los Angeles-San
Francisco Case, 4 C.A.B. 373, 376 (1943); see FULDA, op. cit. SUpra,

at 7.16, 7.17; THomAS, op. cit. supra, at 100-104.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1963

51

South
Carolina Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 5 [1963], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

plies to the grant of a route, then all considerations of traffic
potential, diversion, route planning, and cost will be overridden.20 7 On the other hand, if the doctrine is concerned
with the selection of the carrier, then a public need for air
transportation, consistent with the requirements of traffic
potential and the orderly development of the United States
air transport system, must be demonstrated before a carrier
will be able to qualify.
In the early cases involving the doctrine, the C.A.B. appeared to be concerned with the selection of the carrier that
could contribute to the development of the national system
of air transportation. The famous Ryan concurrence in Eastern Air Lines, Memphis-Greenville Operation2 68 set forth the
considerations that a properly balanced competitive system
of civil aviation could not be maintained by a great disparity
In size between carriers. 269 Thus, he argued, the Board had
a "broader power in the selection of a carrier. 2 70 The implication was that where a route was a sound addition to any
of two applicants it should go to the smaller or "needier" of
the two.2 71 Subsequent cases spoke of the "improvement ...
of competitive position" of the smaller carriers as the criterion for choice of carrier. In all of these cases there was
apparently a demonstrated public need for additional carriers. However, the issue of the separate requirement of
the public necessity was subsequently raised. The Board
took great care to declare that there could be no extension of a carrier's route merely to increase its economic
strength.2 7 2 The Board elaborated:
The public convenience and necessity must be found
to require a proposed new route before one can be authorized. In a particular case the choice of the carrier
to provide the service may be affected, other things
being equal, by the fact that the award of the certificate
to the carrier chosen will economically strengthen that
carrier as a constituent of the national system of air
73
transportation. 2
267. Westwood, at 84.
268. 4C.A.B. 429 (1943).
269. Id. at 438.

270. Id. at 437.
271. Westwood, at 84.
272. Northwest Airlines, Inc., North Central Case, 7 C.A.B. 639 (1946).

273, Northwest Airlines, Inc., Chicago-Milwaukee-New York Service,

6 C.A.B. 217, 224 (1944) ; see Ibid. at 237-38.
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It would seem that with the foregoing statement of principle that the policy of the C.A.B. required a separate public need. As had happened many times before with C.A.B.
declarations of policy, subsequent decisions served only to
confuse and ultimately to engulf the original statement. Only
a few months later Members Landis and Lee dissented on
the ground that the doctrine should be applied on the basis
of the carrier's need. Although they claimed to adhere to a
policy of favoring the weaker carrier in selection of the
carrier, they spoke in sweeping language of "the wise industrial statesmanship" of making a "new system" out of
National and Delta. 27 4 Thus, they emphasized the condition
of the carrier as the primary criterion for award of a route
and came close to saying that a carrier could receive an
award without a finding of independent need.2 7 5
Whether this was their intention or not, the force of their
reasoning appears to have secured a permanent niche at
the C.A.B. In the guise of "industrial statesmanship" carriers that have suffered diversion have been "compensated"
by the award of a new route or allowed "to recapture" traffic
lost through diversion2 7 6 without a finding of public convenience and necessity and the Board has fruitlessly at2 77
tempted "to build" carriers for the international routes.
As an examination of the cases in the international field will
show, the confusion over the policies and factual criteria has
hardly been abated by the Board's decisions, but it has in
fact only increased.
The early cases seem to adhere to a viewpoint that the
carrier with the greater need for the route should be preferred. In a case involving local service in Alaska the Board
sought to protect local carriers by keeping the trunk carriers
out of local service. The Board declared that "local carriers
should be allowed to retain the more lucrative local business
so they can continue to serve the needs of these areas in
Alaska where business is less profitable.1 27 8 Subsequently,
274. Northwest Airlines, Inc., North Central Case, 7 C.A.B. 639, 690

(1946); compare Southwest-Northeast Service Case, 22 C.A.B. 52, 56-57

(1955); New York-Chicago Service Case, 22 C.A.B. 973, 978 (1955);
see Hector, supra note 9, at 940-41.

275. Westwood, at 93.
276. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
277. See notes 301-321 infra and accompanying text.
278. Alaska Airlines, Inc., Service to Anchorage, Alaska, 3 C.A.B.
522, 528 (1942).
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the Board veered toward a more activist view. In the Latin
American Air Service Case,2 79 the Board selected National for
Tampa-Miami-Havana routes in preference to Eastern. Although public need was present in the case, the Board emphasized the need of the carrier as the paramount consideration, saying:
The selection of National will give that carrier an
opportunity to strengthen its competitive position and
to prepare itself to render more effective service. Having fewer route miles and serving fewer large cities, it
now has fewer opportunities than Eastern to increase
utilization of its equipment and to achieve similar economies in operation. The addition of the Miami-Havana
and the Tampa-Havana routes will give National's management an opportunity to realize such gains in operating efficiency. The award of the proposed route to National will place that carrier in the field actively promoting international air travel .... 280
In the next international case presenting the problem, the
Pacific Case,2 8 1 the Board was faced with two applicants,
Pan American and Hawaiian, for the Central Pacific route
to China. Had the Board been willing to premise its decision
on the statements made earlier in the Latin American Case,
discussed supra, and to employ dry logic, the award would
have gone to Hawaiian, a local carrier in the Hawaiian
Islands. The majority saw the undesirability of such a course
of action and bypassed the question altogether. Instead,
they concluded that Pan American should be chosen on the
grounds that it was the "pioneer" and that the route "inte2 82
grated logically" with Pan American's existing routes.
The issue was raised and vigorously propounded by Member
Lee in dissent, but it remained unanswered by the majority.
Although the failure of the Board to resolve the conflict
and to explain the shift in premises gave the appearance
of inconsistency, there does seem to be an explanation for
the Board's actions. It must be recalled that Hawaiian was
a local carrier, i.e., a specialist in local service. Entrance
into trunk line service would, therefore, bring about a conflict of interest between the two types of service. For the
279. 6C.A.B. 857 (1946).

280. Id at 891.

281. 7 C.A.B. 209 (1946).

282. Id. at 229.
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same reason, the Board had prohibited entrance into local
service by trunk carriers, and had prohibited the expansion of
local carriers into trunk carriers. 283 And in an earlier case in
the same year involving Hawaiian and its attempt to expand
into a trunk carrier by obtaining a Hawaii-Los Angeles
route, the Board had denied the Hawaiian
application on
284
the grounds of such conflict of interest.
The other cases, with one outstanding exception, manifest
no sharp departure from the domestic cases. 28 5 At times the
possibility of controversy has been bypassed by referring to
the improvement of a carrier's route system as "incidental
strengthening." 28 6 In other cases the doctrine of strengthening the weak carrier has appeared as such, but it has acted
negatively to prevent competition by larger carriers. In
287
Colonial Air Lines, Washington-Ottcwa-Montreal Service
a small carrier, Colonial, received an extension of its route
system between Montreal and New York City to Washington,
D.C. Although the route integrated better with the systems
of American and Eastern, the Board felt compelled to grant
the route to Colonial because an award to American or
Eastern would result in a loss of connecting business that
Colonial had been interchanging in New York City.28 8 Similar considerations moved the Board to protect a local service
carrier in the Caribbean, Caribbean-Atlantic, by eliminating
Charlotte Amalie and Saint Thomas, Virgin Islands, as stops
289
on Pan American routes.
Aside from the cases providing "incidental strengthening"
it seems, therefore, that the focus of the Board's decisions
in this field has been on the need of the carrier. This was
true with the case that awarded a route stop to Pan American so that it could "recapture" traffic it had lost through
283. Notes 31-35 supra.
284. Hawaiian Case, 7 C.A.B. 83, 109 (1946); see Trans-Pacific
Route Case, supra note 63, at 11; but of. Service to Puerto Rico Case,
26 C.A.B. 72,80 (1957).
285. They are seemingly inconsistent.
286. Trans World Airlines, Inc., India-Bangkok-Manila Extension, 24
C.A.B. 287, 288 (1956); see San Juan-Madrid Case, 25 CA.B. 407, 411
(1957).
287. 6 C.A.B. 481 (1945).
288. Id. at 501. The success of this effort can be judged by Colonial's
subsequent merger with Eastern. See Eastern-Colonial, Acquisition of
Assets, 18 C.A.B. 453 (1954); supplemental opinion, 18 C.A.B. 781
(1954); Colonial-Eastern Acquisition Case, 23 C.A.B. 500 (1956);
Eastern-Colonial Control Case, 20 C.A.B. 629 (1955).
289. Caribbean Area Case, 9 C.A.B. 534 (1948).
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shifts in the Caribbean route system.2 90 Subsequent cases,
which appear to have rejected the emphasis on the need of
the carrier, can generally be distinguished on the grounds
that the doctrine had been intertwined with unacceptable
arguments on the nature of a competitively balanced system.
For example, in an effort to obtain domestic routes, Pan
American argued that it should be allowed to recapture
traffic it had lost as a result of foreign route awards to
other domestic carriers. The Board denied Pan American's
application on numerous grounds - lack of improvement 291
of
service, no new service, and disruption of route patterns.
The rejection of Pan American's argument for strengthening
turned primarily on the idea that Pan American could claim
no right to a substantially equal share of United States traffic, for to allow this argument would be to admit Pan American's premise which the Board had vigorously rejected in a
series of cases, viz., that there should be a "chosen instrument" to conduct foreign air transport in behalf of the United
States. 29 2 The same fate met TWA when it attempted to
argue that carriers in the European market should have
access to equal amounts of traffic to insure financial stability.29 3 The examiner's opinion, adopted by the Board, made
it clear that the policy of maintaining a competitive balance
among United States Air carriers engaged in foreign air
'294
commerce, did not require "perfect equality.
A determination of the third issue, whether there must
be actual improvement, is no less difficult than the resolution of the conflict between the first two over public need
295
and need of the carrier. In the Service to Toronto Case
the Board held that increased utilization of equipment and
personnel by Colonial, the weak carrier, would not be sufficient to require the grant because Colonial could not provide
the service without a substantial subsidy whereas American
would need none to provide the same service. 96 The effect
of the decision was to demand that the carrier in fact be
290. Ibid. at 545, 551, 552; of. Trans-Pacific Certificate Renewal Case,
20 C.A.B. 47, 59 (1955).
291. Pan American Airways, Inc., Domestic Route Case, 11 C.A.B. 852

(1950).

292. Id. at 933-34.
293. North Atlantic Certificate Renewal Case, 15 C.A.B. 1053, 1097

(1951).

294. Id. at 1098.
295. 12 C.A.B. 305 (1951).
296. Id. at 321, 325.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss5/3

56

1963]

Roberts: Criteria for the Award of a Foreign Air Route to a Domestic Air C
923
CRITERIA AWARD - DoMESTIc AIR CARRIR

strengthened by the route award. The Service to Puerto
Rico Case would seem to be in agreement. 297 There the Board
rejected a Delta application for direct San Juan-Chicago
service on the grounds that there was no evidence that Delta
would be strengthened by the award and that there was
even the possibility of weakening Delta.2 98
Although the Toronto and Puerto Rico cases are important
in that they determined the fate of the third issue, it should
be noted that their bearing on the resolution of the conflict
between the first two issues was of equal weight. In effect
they were both premised on the requirement of public need
for the service: If there was not sufficient traffic to support the route, then, the award could not "strengthen" the
carrier. An examination of the cases indicates that such a
requirement had been assumed by the Board. In the Toronto
case the Board stated that it was necessary "to consider
whether the traffic potential is sufficient to support economical operations by two or more carriers .... "299 And in
the Puerto Rico case the problem was explicitly considered
by the examiner, who stated:
Although strengthening of our existing certificated carriers by permitting their entry in strong traffic markets
is a factor which the Board has considered in past cases,
notably in the New York-Florida Case, 24 C.A.B. 94
(1956), it is not a consideration that should be con00
trolling.3
In adopting the report the Board agreed that low traffic
potential was the significant factor.3 0 1
Ultimate resolution of the problems of the doctrine of
strengthening the weak carrier can be had only by examining the decisions relating to the South American routes, for
it is here that all of the weaknesses of the Board's ad hoc
industrial statesmanship are revealed.3 0 2 At the time of the
first postwar route awards there were two United States
297. 26 C.A.B. 72 (1957).
298. Id. at 76, 77.
299. 12 C.A.B. 305, 321 (1951).
300. 26 C.A.B. 72, 152 (1957) (emphasis added); but cf., New YorkMexico City Nonstop Service Case, 25 C.A.B. 323 (1957). See notes 78-94
supra and accompanying text.
301. Instant case, 26 C.A.B. at 77.
302. Cf., Friendly, at 1091: "Decisions that would vitally affect the
economics of the domestic airline industry for generations were taken
in a tone of gay abandon .... "
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carriers providing service to South America, Pan American,
and Panagra, which was owned jointly by Pan American and
the W. R. Grace Co. Pan American provided service from
Miami and Caribbean points to the east coast of South
America, and from Los Angeles to Mexico City. Panagra
served the west coast of South America, but had no United
States terminal. West coast traffic from the United States
was interchanged with Pan American at Balboa, Canal
Zone. 30 3 In the Additional Service to Latin America
Case3"' the Board decided that South American service required two American air carriers, but it split on the question
of introducing a third. When the Board's recommendations
were sent to the President, he decided in favor of the third
service and ordered the Board to issue a certificate of public
convenience and necessity to Braniff to serve the west coast
routes.30 The Board responded by granting routes to Braniff
from Houston and New Orleans via Havana to Balboa down
the west coast with the terminus at Buenos Aires on the
east coast. Braniff was to serve the traffic needs of the
central United States. Since this traffic was too thin at the
time to adequately support the route award, Braniff was
allowed to connect with the east coast carrier, National, at
Havana. An additional advantage of the arrangement was
that National could be strengthened. 0 6
The one remaining problem was to provide the northeast
with service competitive with that offered by Pan American
via San Juan - preferably single carrier service - and to
provide for a source of traffic for Panagra, which had been
extended from the Canal Zone to Miami. The Board seemed
to realize that for Panagra to compete effectively it should
have a measure of control over its traffic sources. Thus, connecting service would not be adequate. The Board had an
additional complication in the fact of the joint ownership
of Panagra by Pan American and W. R. Grace, for Pan
American was using every maneuver known to the law of
corporations to paralyze Panagra in order f keep it out of
303. See e.g., Pan American Airways, Grandfather Certificate, 2 C.A.B.
111 (1940); Pan American-Grace Airlines, Grandfather Certificate, 2
C.A.B. 104 (1940).
304. 6 C.A.B. 857 (1946).

305. Ibid.

306. Id. at 891.
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the mainland United States 3 07 In the process of settling
Panagra's internal difficulties, the Board also was able to
solve the problem of providing the northeastern United States
with single-carrier service. The answer was found in the
99 year "through flight" agreement which concluded the
internecine warfare between Panagra's owners. The terms
stipulated that Pan American would charter Panagra aircraft on an interchange basis, thus providing Panagra with
access to United States mainland traffic and consumating
the Board's plan for single-carrier service between the northeastern United States and the Canal Zone.30 8
Had the Board's and the president's estimates of the traffic potential of the South American routes been substantially
correct, many of the South American carriers' subsequent
ills might not have developed. Unfortunately, it soon became
apparent that the public need did not require two carriers
to the west coast. After the first year the pattern for Latin
American troubles was apparent. Panagra responded with
a petition to the Board to suspend Braniff's rights on the
ground that Braniff's diversion of Panagra traffic had increased costs beyond a profitable level. Optimism still reigned
at the Board, and the petition was denied. 30 9
The problem of competitive balance was persistent, however, and increasingly the Board was called upon to
"strengthen" carriers involved in Latin American service.
National, which had originally been strengthened in 1946,
required additional aid two years later.31 0 By 1951 it was
apparent that previous measures, including an interchange at
Havana, had failed to help National and Braniff. 11 Accordingly, the Board strengthened Braniff again by granting it
a stop at Miami on the Houston-Havana route. By admitting
Braniff to the rich gateway traffic at Miami, the Board
307. Panagra Terminal Investigation, 4 C.A.B. 670 (1944); reversed
1946); cert. denied, 332 U.S. 827, 92 L.Ed. 402 (1946). This same accusa-

and remanded sub nom. W. R. Grace & Co. v. C.A.B., 154 F.2d 271 (2d Cir.

tion has been recently repeated by the C.A.B. in its temporary order requiring Pan American to divest itself of all interest in Panagra. Pan

American-Panagra Acquisition Case, Docket 14452; Panagra-Pan American-Grace Investigation, Docket 14641, Order E-19789, July 9, 1963.
308. Pan American-Panagra Agreement, 8 C.A.B. 50 (1947).

309. Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc. et aL, Petition, 9 C.A.B. 325
(1948).
310. Middle Atlantic Area Case, 9 C.A.B, 131, 144 (1948).
311. National Route Investigation, 12 C.A.B. 798 (1951).
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believed that it would be able to maintain competition be12
tween United States' carriers in South America.
Meanwhile, the Board continued its efforts to achieve the
goals it had set in the Latin American Case of competitive,
single-carrier service from New York to Balboa. In 1954
it announced the results of its investigations in the first
New York-Balboa Through Service Proceedings Reopened
case. 13 These were (1) that the Board would seek to reduce
air mail subsidy payments and (2) that the Latin American
service required a single independent carrier free from control of Pan American or W. R. Grace on the Houston-Miami
and points beyond route to South America.3 14 The solution
which the Board chose was to rearrange the interchange
system serving the northeastern United States. Fearing the
conjunction of a strong carrier such as Eastern with either
Pan American or Panagra, which was, for the purposes
of the case, the alter ego of Pan American, the Board directed that Eastern join with Braniff to provide interchange
service, which the Board thought would be competitive with
Pan American. 1 5 But in strengthening Braniff, the Board
had also created a situation of severe diversion for National,
another "weak" carrier. In order to protect National the
Board then authorized a second New York-Balboa interchange service between Pan American, Panagra, and Na3 16
tional.
Thus, the stage was set for the present debacle in the
South American service. Although the Board as much as
admitted that the traffic potential between New York and
Balboa was inadequate to serve two competing interchange
services, the Board dismissed arguments against excessive
authorization by cautioning the carriers against the dangers
of over capacity in air transport!3 1 7 Member Ryan dissented
312. Braniff Airways, Inc., Exemption, 14 C.A.B. 327 (1951).
313. 18 C.A.B. 501 (1954).
314. Ibid. at 502, 504, 505. The Board also indulged in some administrative coercion by suggesting that Pan American and W. R. Grace
could save the expenses of a pending anti-trust divestiture suit by merging Panagra and Braniff. Ibid. at 505. See Ryan, Ibid. at 508 (dissent)
(strongly criticizing Board action as improper.) See United States v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc., W. R. Grace and Company and
Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc., 193 F.Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961),
r'vised, 83 S.Ct. 476 (1963) (the C.A.B. has primary jurisdiction).
315. Instant case, 20 C.A.B. 493, 501-502 (1954); compare 18 CA.B.
501,504 (1954).
316. Instant case, 20 C.A.B. at 504.
317. Id. at 511.
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vigorously that the Board had neglected route planning and
had ignored the inadequacy of the traffic potential. In the
first instance, he pointed out that the northeastern states
had been denied single plane service because National's
routes only extended to New York and that Eastern was the
only carrier with extensive and effective service in the
area.318 Secondly, he argued that the decision compounded
duplication by creating two interchange services, whereas,
in a major domestic market with 30% more passenger traffic,
the Board had authorized only one such service. 19
The futility of this exercise has since become apparent.
The recent United States-South America Route Investigation3 20 is but one long admission of the Board's failure in
"industrial statesmanship." In spite of interchanges, Braniff's share of the South American traffic has continued to
decline and the competitive balance of the South American
service has become even more lop-sided.3 21 There are many
reasons cited by the Board for its failure, foreign competition, the advent of nonstop jet service, etc. Presidential
action overriding a split board may even be one. But the
Board's initial mistake in attempting to apply the doctrine
of strengthening the weak carrier without first considering
the public need for service must surely be counted as a fundamental cause of the present unhealthy situation of United
States' carriers in Latin America. Admittedly, it may be
argued that Braniff was thrust upon the Board, but that
would not be an adequate ground for the Board's subsequent
decisions which were often made in a factual vacuum and
without a clear policy for a guideline. Lack of administrative
standards here was critical. Instead of making the best of
a bad job, the effect of the Board's decisions was to make a
bad thing worse.

318. Id. at 519, 521.
319. Id. at 517.

320. See supra note 27. A similar failure is recorded in the New
York-Florida Renewal Case, Docket 12285, Order E-19910, August 15,
1963, where the Board admitted its failure to strengthen Northeast Airlines by giving it a supposedly lucrative long haul route.
321. Id. at 16-19. The advent of long range jets have rendered interchange ineffective because a stop is necessary at the junction of the
two systems, whereas other carriers over the route can fly nonstop.
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